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Streamlining of Policies or Additional 
Level of Complexity? The Impact of the 
EEAS on EU - Western Balkans Relations
Wolfgang Koeth1
ABSTRACT:
Through the creation of a European External Action Service (EEAS) the EU has attempted to increase 
the consistency and visibility of its external action abroad. However, in the Western Balkans the im-
pact of this new diplomatic service of the EU is not always obvious: EU enlargement, as the dominat-
ing policy framework, remains outside the EEAS’ scope of competence. In Kosovo and Bosnia, with 
their strong CFSP dimension, synergies are still limited. Whereas the mutation of the EC Delegations 
into EU Delegations under the authority of the EEAS (but with a strong Commission component) 
had the benefit of raising the EU’s visibility in the Western Balkans, questions remain about internal 
coordination and the risk of a possible hijacking of the new service by member states. Although 
the EEAS can facilitate the streamlining the EU’s external action in the Western Balkans, such an 
outcome depends more on the behaviour of the actors involved than on institutional arrangements.
KEY WORDS:
EEAS, enlargement, CSDP, Western Balkans, Lisbon Treaty
1  Correspondence to: w.koeth@eipa.eu
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With the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, a 
new area in EU external relations seemed to have dawned: through the 
creation of the new position of a EU High Representative, doubling as vice-
president of the Commission, and of the European External Action Service 
the EU intended to overcome its old schism in external action between 
the Community-driven set of external policies (development, trade, 
enlargement, humanitarian assistance) and the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy/Common Security and Defence Policy under the auspices 
of the member states (Wessels/Bopp 2008; Missiroli 2010). There was 
growing awareness among member states that the lack of consistency2 
between the policies and institutions of the EU was standing in the way 
of its self-declared role of a global player that would be able to promote 
European norms and values around the world.3
The call for consistency in the EU’s external relations had increased 
over the past decades in parallel with the increase of the EU’s external 
competences, and became, during the 1990s, “something of a refrain” 
in the different versions of the EU Treaties (Duke 1999). The definition of 
“consistency” has been further defined by reference to horizontal and 
vertical coherence (Krenzler/Schneider 1997). Whereas the former refers 
to the different EU policies and institutions, the latter relates to the relations 
between member states and the EU. The need for more coherence/
consistency on one side and for more international visibility on the other 
side had been a constant ingredient of strategic EU documents such 
as the 2003 “European Security Strategy” and the 2006 “Europe in the 
World” communication of the European Commission. These ideas were 
finally taken up in the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty on the EU’s “external 
action,” a concept that was forged in order to underline the objective 
of a holistic approach in EU foreign policy, which would include both the 
former first-pillar external policies as well as CFSP/CSDP.
One region where the EU’s lack of overall strategy had been felt in particular 
were the Western Balkans. Unable to speak with one voice in the 1990s 
2  The term “consistency” is used in the English version of the Treaties, whereas the French and German texts refer to 
“cohérence” and “Kohärenz.” There has been an academic debate about whether these terms have exactly the 
same meaning (Tietje 1997; Bacot-Décriaud and Plantin, 1993). However, seen from a political rather than a legal 
or linguistic point of view, these terms are interchangeable. In the English language the expression “coherence and 
consistency” is frequently used (Nutall 2005). 
3  The painful episode of the ECOWAS case, during which the Commission and the Council blocked each other from 
helping West African states to set up a strategy for the collection of small arms and light weapons (SALW) was a 
strong reminder of how, on the international stage, the EU was standing in its own way.
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the EU had to stand at the sidelines while the conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia 
and Kosovo were unfolding. The EU twice witnessed its own irrelevance 
as US-led NATO troops put an end to the killings of civilians and to ethnic 
cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo. 
Throughout the 1990s, it was not the EU which had shaped the Western 
Balkans: it were rather the Western Balkans that were shaping the EU. 
Both the setting up of the CFSP in 1992 and of the European Security and 
Defence Policy in 1999 were direct consequences of the failure of the 
EC/EU to play a constructive role in the Balkan conflicts. The setting up 
of the ESDP (now CSDP) in 1999 had briefly nourished hopes that the EU 
would finally pass from words to actions.4 But rather than enhancing the 
actorness and visibility of the EU in the Balkans, the CSDP added another 
layer of complexity. The pre-Lisbon involvement of the EU in Kosovo served 
as a puzzling illustration: up to seven missions were speaking simultaneously 
on behalf of the EU in Kosovo, and the 27 member states still disagree 
whether this area of 11000 km2 is to be regarded as an independent state 
or a Serbian province under UN administration, even though Kosovo has 
been enjoying the status of a “potential candidate” for EU accession.
There used to be minimal coordination between the Commission-driven 
enlargement agenda and the Council-driven CFSP/CSDP. Each of these 
followed their own structures, objectives and lines of command: whereas 
the Commission’s enlargement policy focuses on processes (enabling the 
partners to meet EU standards), the CSDP missions rather focus on results, 
if necessary through their own means, imposing stability/the Rule of Law, 
rather than empowering the local authorities to achieve these results 
themselves. 
Consequently, there were a lot of expectations that the Lisbon Treaty with 
its foreign policy objectives of increased coherence, consistency and 
visibility in the EU’s external action would also have a positive impact on the 
relations between the EU and the Western Balkans. At the time of writing 
of this article, the Lisbon Treaty has been in force for almost three years 
and the new European External Action Service (EEAS), created as the EU’s 
unified diplomatic service intended to streamline the EU’s external action 
4  So far, the EU has implemented two military (Macedonia and Bosnia) and four civilian (Kosovo, Bosnia, 
Macedonia) missions in the Western Balkans. Two of them (EULEX Kosovo and ALTHEA Bosnia) are still ongoing. 
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by bringing on board Commission, Council and the Member states, has 
been functional for almost two years. Therefore, from a Western Balkans 
perspective, the time may be right to look at the concrete results and 
ask whether the Lisbon Treaty and the EEAS have been able to meet the 
set objective and to streamline the EU’s external action in this region. 
Or has the EEAS just added another layer of complexity to the already 
multilayer EU-Western Balkans relations? We obviously have to make a 
distinction between the candidate countries (Croatia, Montenegro, 
Serbia and Macedonia) and the “potential candidates” (Bosnia and 
Kosovo). In the candidate countries, the enlargement agenda remains 
the dominant policy framework, whereas Bosnia and Kosovo still have a 
strong CFSP dimension, as both host missions under the Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP). Albania, as another potential candidate, will 
fall in the same category as the candidate countries for this analysis, given 
the absence of a particular CFSP agenda. Whereas the reform of the EU’s 
external action is obviously broader than the EEAS, this analysis will focus 
on the External Action Service, given that it is the most visible part of the 
Lisbon Treaty in the Western Balkans.
The EEAS: consolidating the EU’s external relations, 
except enlargement
The Lisbon Treaty itself gives little guidance regarding the design and the 
responsibilities of the EEAS, besides stating that this service “shall work in 
cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States and shall 
comprise officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat 
of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from 
national diplomatic services of the Member States”.5 The Council Decision 
of July 20106 clarifies that the new service is a “functionally autonomous 
body of the European Union, separate from the General Secretariat of 
the Council and from the Commission.”7 An annex to the decision lists 
5  TEU, art. 27.3.
6  Council Decision of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the EEAS (2010/427/EU), OJ 
L 201/30.
7  Council Decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the EEAS, art. 2.1.
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the different departments of both the Commission and the Council to 
be transferred into the new service. Also, in its Article 9, the decision lists 
the financial instruments for which the EEAS has to assume a responsibility 
(together with the Commission) in the strategic planning of the respective 
instruments. The fact that the decision mentions neither DG Enlargement 
nor the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) testifies that no competences 
with regards to enlargement policy have been transferred to the new 
service,8 and that DG Enlargement retains the exclusive competence for 
dealing with EU enlargement. Thus, given that enlargement dominates 
EU-Western Balkan relations, is the EEAS (except for Bosnia/Kosovo) of any 
relevance for the countries of this region? 
This assertion would imply to neglect the fact that all EU delegations are 
now structurally part of the EEAS. Therefore, after assessing the impact 
of the EEAS on Kosovo and Bosnia, we will examine the consequences 
of the new institutional setting in the other Western Balkan countries. Has 
the EEAS improved: 1) the coherence and consistency of the different EU 
actors and 2) increased the visibility of the EU as a foreign policy actor in 
the region?
1) The EEAS: more coherence and consistency?
a) Coherence and consistency between Enlargement and 
CSDP
With the setting up of the new service, the EEAS has nominally inherited the 
responsibilities for the two remaining CSDP Missions in the Western Balkans: 
EUFOR Althea in Bosnia (military) and EULEX Kosovo (civilian). In this context 
the relation between the different EU actors (Commission and EULEX rule 
of law mission, the latter structurally under the EEAS) is of particular interest, 
as both EULEX and the Commission have a common objective in Kosovo, 
namely building the Rule of Law. For the Commission, this aim is part of 
its efforts to steer Kosovo towards compliance with the Copenhagen 
criteria, a precondition for EU accession, given that Kosovo has the status 
of a “potential candidate” since the 2003 Thessaloniki agenda. In order 
8 The same holds true for EU Trade Policy and financial assistance, given that the Treaty confers to the Commission 
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to achieve this objective the Commission uses its standard enlargement 
methodology based on local ownership and voluntary compliance with 
European norms and standards (the bottom-up approach) which yielded 
excellent results in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe which 
entered the EU in 2004 and 2007, as well as in Croatia. On the other hand, 
EULEX, as a CSDP mission, takes a more security-oriented perspective, 
focusing on the result rather than on the process, and using, among 
others, its executive powers to reach this result (top-down approach). This 
is problematic in so far as imposing the rule of law from above bears the 
risk of weakening the ownership of the local authorities; why should Kosovo 
justice institutions should take risks and expose themselves to public scorn 
(for example, by pursuing former warlords who are still locally perceived 
as heroes), if such ungrateful and risky cases can be handled by EULEX?
But EULEX is more than just an executive mission: according to its 
mandate,9 it is also there to “mentor, monitor and advise” the relevant 
Kosovo institutions in all areas related to the wider rule of law. Capacity 
building in the field of Rule of Law is an activity traditionally covered by 
the Commission, but it might be difficult to establish a clear division line 
between “mentoring” and “capacity building.” In Kosovo it is common 
that EU police, justice and customs experts contracted and paid by the 
European Commission under the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) work 
side by side with European judges, police and customs officials under the 
authority of EULEX. In practice this “cohabitation” works fairly well. Since 
most of the experts on the ground are generally not coming from EU 
institutions but from either the Member states or the private sector, they 
consider themselves to be a part of the same epistemic expert community 
and are generally not much concerned with the conceptual differences 
that might occur at the top management levels. 
On the receiving end the Kosovo justice institutions make, for their part, 
the best of it; they take the funds for infrastructural measures, equipment 
and capacity building from the Delegation, draw on the advice and 
experience of their EULEX counterparts and, occasionally, pass to EULEX 
the responsibility for particular sensitive cases.
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b) Coherence and consistency within the EEAS
The question of coherence and consistency is not limited to Enlargement/
CSDP or Commission/EEAS. From an organisational point of view, it is also 
an internal challenge for the new service, in particular with regards to 
the CSDP missions: the political control and strategic direction over these 
missions comes from the Political and Security Committee (structurally 
part of the EEAS, but in fact a Council Working Group) chaired by the High 
representative. However, a closer look at the EEAS organigramme10 shows 
that the specialised CSDP bodies in charge of planning and implementing 
these operations, as well as the EUSR, remain largely unconnected to 
the main structure of the EEAS. So does the EU Special Representative 
(EUSR, as we know double-hatted as Head of Delegation), who also has 
the mandate of giving “local political guidance” to the CSDP mission, 
but who is not linked to the crisis management bodies. Instead, there is 
a direct reporting line from both the crisis management bodies and the 
EUSR to the HR, which bypasses the regular EEAS bureaucracy (country 
and thematic desks, Corporate and Policy Board).11
Also, for security reasons, some of the crisis-management related bodies of 
the EEAS (like the CMPD or the Military Staff) have not moved to the new 
EEAS headquarters on Rond Point Schuman in Brussels. Even if this might 
appear just a technicality, it reflects the fact that these bodies are hardly 
affected by the organisational changes that the EEAS has brought about, 
as they seem to continue “business as usual.” The new “esprit de corps” 
of the EEAS, often quoted as indispensable for the functioning of the new 
service, is still not broadly felt – in particular in the crisis-management bodies 
that were, officially, transferred from the Council to the EEAS in 2011. 
Far more serious than the possible inconsistencies in the EEAS 
organigramme is the question of inconsistency between the positions of 
the member states (vertical inconsistency). As CFSP and CSDP remain 
essentially intergovernmental, the principle of unanimity remains the 
norm. Remembering that 22 member states recognize Kosovo and 5 do 
not, it is difficult to imagine how the Political and Security Committee 
10 The up-to-date organigramme can be found at http://eeas.europa.eu/background/docs/organisation_en.pdf
11 It can be assumed that such a setup was lobbied for by (some) member states that did not want any supranational 
elements originating from the former DG Relex/DG Development to get involved into the planning and running of 
the Common Security and Defence Policy.
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could exercise its strategic direction, or how the EUSR could offer political 
guidance, if the basic political parameters are disputed. For example, 
until this day there is no clear position within EULEX which legislation is to 
be applied by its judges and prosecutors: the legislation of the Republic 
of Kosovo or pre-independence legislation consisting of a mixture of 
UNMIK regulations, post-1999 Kosovo laws endorsed by UNMIK and pre-
1989 Serbian legislation. Given the absence of a common approach by 
the member states, neither the PSC nor the EUSR were able to give the 
necessary guidance to EULEX, which is left to its own devices and passes 
the responsibility down to the individual actors.
c) The cohabitation of EEAS and Commission within the 
Delegations
In the light of this situation, it appears that the interaction between the 
EEAS and the Commission is limited to the two countries, Kosovo and 
Bosnia, where the EU has deployed a CSDP mission. But this would ignore 
the role of the EU Delegations which are, according to the Lisbon Treaty, 
structurally part of the EEAS. Article 2.4 of the 2010 EEAS Decision states 
that “the EEAS shall be made up of a central administration and of the 
Union Delegations to third countries and to international organizations” 
and states that the Head of Delegation “shall be accountable to the High 
Representative.”12 At the same time, the Decision acknowledges the fact 
that, given that EU enlargement policy dominates the political agendas in 
the Western Balkans and that the EEAS is not competent for enlargement 
policy, a rather significant number of the Delegation staff shall be coming 
from the European Commission.13
12 Art. 5, EEAS Decision.
13 “Staff in delegations shall comprise EEAS staff and, where appropriate for the implementation of the Union budget 
and Union policies other than those under the remit of the EEAS, commission staff” EEAS Decision art. 5.
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Let’s take a closer look at the staffing of the Delegations:
Staffing of EU Delegation in the Countries of the Western Balkans
EEAS Commission Total % EEAS
Delegation Croatia 13 56 69 19
Delegation Serbia 17 88 105 16
Delegation BiH 19 (without EUSR) 75 94 20
Delegation Montenegro 10 35 45 22
Delegation Macedonia/
FYROM
19 62 81 23
EU Office Kosovo 16 (without EUSR) 64 80 20
Delegation Albania 14 51 65 21
Source: EEAS, October 2012
These numbers do not include the staff of the EUSR in Bosnia and in Kosovo 
(about 20) who also work under the roof of the Delegation and who are 
paid by a different budget line. It is interesting to see that the ratio EEAS/
Commission is basically the same in all Enlargement Delegations, whether 
there is a CSDP mission or not, or whether the country is a candidate 
country or a potential candidate.14
As we see from the numbers, the vast majority of Delegation staff are 
deployed by the Commission.15 The Commission employs all staff working 
in the Operations section and the Contract & Finance section, as their 
tasks are related to the implementing of EU pre-accession assistance, 
and thus the execution of the EU budget, an exclusive prerogative of the 
14 The relatively low number of staff in the Delegation in Zagreb can be explained by the fact that the management 
of IPA pre-accession assistance (the largest activity of any Delegation) has been almost entirely delegated to the 
National authorities, in order to prepare the country for the implementation of structural funds after accession. 
15 Whereas most of them come from the Commission’s DG enlargement (ELARG), there are also a number of staff 
working for DG Region or DG Employment in the candidate countries, since candidate countries have access to 
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Commission. However, according to Article 5.2 of the EEAS’s decision, 
each Delegation is subordinated to a Head of Delegation, who “shall 
have authority over all staff in the delegation, whatever their status.16
The post-Lisbon delegations can thus be schematized as follows: 
 
W.Koeth EIPA 2012 ©
EEAS Staff






Programming  & Implementation IPA
Operations , Contract & Finance, 
Political Affairs (part)
Head of Delegation
Overall authority and  responsibility 
Instructions from HR/VP
Instructions from COM
Exchange of information 
(Dipl. Services of MS)
EU Delegations in (potential) candidate countries
according to Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26/7/2010
- DG ELARG 
(copy of the instructions 
provided to the Head of 
Delegation)
other DGs (REGIO,  EMPL...)
Implementation of 
‘operational credits’ in third 
country
E U   D e l e g a t i o n reporting
Commission staff in the Delegations: servants of 
two masters?
As we see from this scheme, Commission staff have two lines of command: 
the Head of Delegation for the “overall management of the work of 
the delegation and for ensuring the coordination of all actions of the 
Union” (art. 5.2.2.), and the respective Commission DG for the issues that 
fall under its competence (art. 5.3.2). In addition, the preamble of the 
Council decision states that “when the Commission will issue instructions 
16 The Head of Delegation can be a former Commission official, a former Council official, or even a national diplomat 
with the status of a temporary agent of the EEAS.
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to delegations, it will simultaneously provide a copy hereof to the Head of 
Delegation and to the EEAS central administration” (recital 13). 
This raises the question of possible conflicts of interest in areas without a 
clear delimitation, such as the security/development nexus,17 resulting in 
conflicting instructions to a staff member. It should be taken into account 
that the Head of Delegation can be a national diplomat on temporary 
assignment with the EEAS. Such a diplomat has the perspective of 
reintegrating into the national diplomatic service of his/her country of 
origin after a maximum of 10 years working for the EEAS,18 and might thus 
hesitate to make choices which could be perceived as going against the 
interests of his/her home country.
Both Commission and the EEAS are aware of this potential risk and have 
taken measures to avert such situations. The Commission had created a 
unit for external institutional relations in 2010 and has published guidelines 
for relations between the Commission and the EEAS in January 2012.19 
At first sight, this step seems to have strengthened the position of the 
Commission vis-à-vis the EEAS. The guidelines state that, in its areas of 
competence, the Commission has a right to instruct not only its staff, but 
also the Head of Delegation:
“The Head of Delegation receives instructions from the HR/VP and the EEAS 
and the Commission. In areas where the Commission exercises the powers 
conferred to it by the Treaties, it may issue instructions to the Delegation, 
copying the EEAS, which shall be executed under the Head of Delegation’s 
overall responsibility. For example, the Commission can, through the 
Head of Delegation, call on EU Delegations to carry out activities related 
to policy implementation, demarches and policy advocacy on issues of 
Commission competences (e.g. trade, humanitarian affairs, etc.). The 
Head of Delegation is responsible for the execution of all instructions, 
calling on the relevant staff in the Delegation to carry them through.” 
(“Working arrangements”, p.3 section 1.1)
17 One could imagine a situation where the Commission favours financing of infrastructure measures in a minority 
region controlled by separatist authorities, which is rejected by the Head of Delegation for political reasons for fear 
of conferring legitimacy to the non-recognised authorities.
18 Art. 6.11 of the EEAS decision provides for a maximum period of service of eight years, unless it is extended for a 
maximum period of two years in exceptional circumstances and in the interest of the service.
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The document also specifically mentions enlargement as one of the areas 
where the Commission remains fully competent:
“EU Delegations in the countries covered by the enlargement policy 
will continue to play a central role in monitoring and reporting on pre-
accession preparations, compliance with the Copenhagen criteria, the 
management of the (Stabilisation and) Association Agreements and the 
implementation of EU assistance and cooperation. In this context, the Head 
of Delegation will receive instructions directly from DG Enlargement and 
other relevant services. Contributions to the annual Enlargement package 
and Commission Opinions on membership will be sent confidentially to 
DG ELARG, given that the Commission is solely institutionally responsible 
for the preparation of these documents. EEAS shall be kept informed. 
In the case of political demarches concerning compliance with the 
Copenhagen political criteria, DG ELARG, after consulting the EEAS, will 
issue the relevant draft to be agreed by the Member States.” (“Working 
arrangements”, p.3 section 1.2)
The “Working arrangements” also confirm the Commission’s dominance 
in the Instrument for Pre-Accession (p.28), Communication (p.34) and 
briefings (p.37)
Interestingly, whereas the EEAS decision ascribes the Commission the right 
to issue instructions to the Delegations (with the Head of Delegation in 
copy), the “Working Arrangements” repeatedly mention that instructions 
are to be issued to the Head of Delegation HoD). This raises the question: 
in which cases the Commission can directly instruct their staff and when it 
has to channel the instructions vie the HoD? According to the coordination 
unit, it is both the Commission and the EEAS which have to work out, 
depending on the nature of the request and/or the political importance 
of the subject matter, whether instructions are directed to the Head of 
Delegation or are merely copied to him/her.20 Whereas this seems to be a 
measure of common sense, this arrangement might not be entirely fixed 
as it leaves a margin of interpretation for both the Commission and the 
EEAS about the exact nature of the request and the perceived political 
importance. Only time will prove the viability of these arrangements.
20 e-mail exchange, European Commission, May 2012
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2) Increased visibility?
As we have seen from the above, the intended increase in coherence 
and consistency of the EU’s action in the Western Balkans is anything but 
obvious. But what about the other big objective of the Lisbon Treaty with 
regard to the EU’s external action, namely the question of its own visibility?
This question was a sore point for the EU in the pre-Lisbon days, and 
particularly stringent in the Western Balkans. Before the Lisbon Treaty the 
EU was basically represented in third countries through two actors: the 
Delegation of the European Commission, representing the European 
Communities (the “first pillar”), and the Ambassador of the Country 
holding the six-monthly rotating Council presidency, representing the EU 
on all matters relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Since 
an important number of policy fields fell under parallel competences, both 
the Delegation and the Presidency would express themselves in public 
on these issues. Quite often, one of the smaller member states holding 
the Presidency would not have an own embassy in a given country. 
According to EU protocol the Presidency functions were then exercised 
by the country of the upcoming presidency. For example, when Portugal 
(which has no embassies in the Western Balkans except for Croatia and 
Serbia) held the rotating presidency in the second semester of 2007, the 
presidency functions in other Western Balkan countries were exercised 
by the Slovenian ambassador, as this country was next in the row for EU 
Presidency. As we can imagine, the ever-changing and little-known faces 
publicly speaking “in the name of the EU” for reasons that were difficult 
to understand did little to enhance the EU’s visibility in the respective 
countries.
In addition, between 2000 and 2007 EU assistance in Serbia, Montenegro, 
Kosovo and Macedonia was delivered not, as usual, through the EC 
Delegation, but through a specialised implementing agency, the 
European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR). Due to its nature, this agency 
was sometimes more visible than the local EC Delegation.21 In addition to 
21 It was a common complaint among Heads of Delegation in these countries during that time that the Head of the 
EAR often took the limelight at photo opportunities with high-level local politicians, whereas the Head of Delegation 
was seated as a spectator among the invited guests.
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this came an EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) active in the Western Balkans 
until 2007 and the CSDP mission(s) plus the EU Special Representative 
in the case of Kosovo, Bosnia and Macedonia. The Kosovo case is the 
most extreme, given the presence of the so called “Pillar IV” of the UN 
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which was financed by the EU and displayed 
the EU Flag (plus an Internet address www.euinkosovo.org). Even more, 
until 2011 the EU Special Representative (who as such did not recognize 
the independence of Kosovo) was double-hatted as International 
Civilian Representative (ICR) with a mandate to oversee the conditional 
independence of Kosovo, thus making the EU presence in Kosovo 
unintelligible even to the well-informed local public.
The consolidation of EU presence in the Western Balkans that took place 
between 2007 and 2011 was partly due to general considerations of 
efficiency and partly to the Lisbon Treaty. The EUMM and the EAR were 
both closed in 2007 as the post-conflict agenda had given way to a pre-
accession agenda, and the responsibility for implementing EU assistance 
had been handed over from the EAR to the European Commission. UNMIK 
and its “Pillar IV” had outlived themselves with Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence in 2008. The Lisbon Treaty, after entering into force in late 
2009, cancelled the role of the rotating presidency in representing the EU 
in third countries by making the EU Delegation competent for speaking on 
all EU matters including CFSP. The Treaty also provided for the merging of 
the role of Head of Delegation with the one of EU Special Representative 
(although such a merger was not necessarily dependent on the Lisbon 
Treaty: in Macedonia the Head of Delegation had been double-hatted 
as EUSR since 2005). 
The Lisbon Treaty and the EEAS, as explained above, cannot be given 
credit for all the measures that led to the consolidation of EU presence and 
therefore to a better visibility of the EU on the ground. However, the new 
Treaty also had an undeniable positive impact. Even if the CSDP missions 
in Kosovo and Bosnia are still acting independently from the Commission/
EUSR, the EU Delegations have now taken the lead in local coordination 
of the representatives of the Member states and in being a “one-stop-
shop” interacting with the local authorities. It is the Head of Delegation 
who is entitled to speak on all EU-relevant matters (including CFSP). For the 
EU, having a common interface for the local partners gives an important 
boost to its own visibility.
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Conclusion
The Lisbon Treaty has not overcome the challenge of coherence and 
consistency in the EU’s external action, regardless of a few innovative 
features that have the potential to reach this objective (EEAS, double-
headed HR/VP, EU Delegations). This is primarily due to the still existing 
need for unanimity in matters pertaining to the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, which often leaves the EU without a position in politically 
controversial cases such as the recognition of Kosovo’s independence.
In the Western Balkans, the gains in coherence and consistency are even 
less palpable, because enlargement as the dominating policy agenda is 
widely unaffected by the Treaty changes. Furthermore, the functioning 
of the CSDP missions in Kosovo and Bosnia is largely unaffected; the 
integration of the bodies in charge of CFSP/CSDP into the EEAS remains 
incomplete without a little practical change for the functioning of these 
missions on the ground. 
EU-Western Balkans relations are more likely to change under the impact 
of the global political climate rather than because of institutional changes 
within the EU. As the countries of the Western Balkans have ceased to be 
a stability threat to the region (and to Europe in general), the raison d’être 
for the remaining two CSDP missions in Kosovo in Bosnia is dwindling away 
and their days may not last for long.22 On the other hand, the image of 
the EU as a shining beacon has suffered considerably as the result of the 
Euro crisis,23 meaning that the EU’s normative power might further erode in 
the future. Since both the EU and the (potential) candidates are aware of 
the reduced likeliness that any new member states (except Croatia) will 
be accepted until the end of the decade, the enthusiasm for reform in 
these countries has visibly slowed down. In the same spirit, the Commission 
does no longer regard the (potential) candidates’ compliance with the 
EU acquis as a top priority for getting EU funds. Instead, the Commission 
22 “our message is clear: EULEX will not stay eternally in Kosovo”, Hansjörg Haber, EU Civilian Operations 
Commander, quoted on 25/5/12 by Nicolas Gros-Verheyde http://www.bruxelles2.eu/zones/bosnie-kosovo/
la-mission-eulex-au-kosovo-reduite.html
23 Dimitar Bechev, “The Periphery of the Periphery: The Western Balkans and the Euro Crisis” Policy Brief, European 
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focuses in its new draft regulation on the Instrument for Pre-accession 
Assistance (IPA II)24 on more on classical development objectives such 
as good governance, the rule of law and socio-economic development.
However, the Lisbon treaty and the EEAS can be given credit for enhancing 
the EU’s visibility in the countries of the Western Balkans, given that they 
have contributed to reducing the cacophony of voices that spoke 
in the Western Balkans in the name of the EU. This is to be welcomed, 
but also carries a risk: as national diplomats of the member states have 
been integrated into the EEAS and are eligible for the position of Head 
of Delegation, national political agendas might find their way into these 
delegations. The often evoked “état d’esprit” of the new service is still 
underdeveloped (and would not cover the Commission part of the 
delegation anyway). Not all national diplomats serving on a temporary 
assignment for the EEAS (and wishing to pursue their national career after 
a stint at the EEAS) might be highly motivated for defending the interests 
of the EU, if these go against the interests of their member states. Both 
the EEAS and the Commission have to be vigilant to avoid any attempts 
to hijack the EEAS and the delegations by member states. On the other 
hand, if the EEAS fails to take the national factor into sufficient account, 
the risk is that the big member states in particular might just ignore the 
EEAS and pursue their own bilateral agendas. In the end, the EU’s success 
in the Balkans will depend on the degree to which the member states, the 
Commission and the EEAS will pursue a harmonised approach. The Lisbon 
Treaty has produced the instruments for more coherence. But the impact 
of the Treaty and of the EEAS on the Western Balkans will not essentially 
depend on the institutional arrangements. Rather, it will be determined by 
the behaviour of the different actors involved.
24 COM(2011) 838 final, 7.12.2011
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Decitizenization of Migrants in Slovenia
Mojca Pajnik1
Abstract
The article addresses the social and economic conditions of migrant workers from the former Yugoslav 
states who form the vast majority of the migrant population in Slovenia. Based on the analysis of 
policies that regulate the work of “foreigners” and on the assessment of recent anti-crisis measures 
we argue that the current securitization approach, which aims to protect the national labour mar-
ket, exacerbates the poor work and life conditions of migrants. We look into the current massive 
layoffs of migrant workers due to the closing of companies and the subsequent return of migrants 
to their countries of birth, which is a trend supported by “circular migration” policies. Furthermore, 
we explore recent xenophobic sentiments, as well as emerging solidarity with migrants. Particular 
attention is devoted to nuances in the definitions of migrants that are motivated by the protectionist-
prone ideologies of a young state. The article relies on data on migration trends and policies during 
the recent period (2008–2012), but also draws on interviews and focus groups with migrants. The 
issues raised are debated with theories of citizenship. Namely, we discuss the processes of “(de)
citizenization” of migrants in Slovenia and the constructions by which former “co-nationals” were 
turned into “third country nationals.”  
KEY WORDS:
migration, citizenship, securitization, labour market, Slovenia
1 Correspondence to: mojca.pajnik@mirovni-institut.si
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Introduction
This article addresses the social and economic conditions of precarious 
migrant workers in post-socialist Slovenia which has adopted EU legal and 
political frameworks since 2004, when it became an EU member state. 
Based on the analysis of the recent policy framework that regulates 
employment and work of migrants, and on the assessment of anti-crisis 
measures and social policy, we argue that the current “securitization 
approach” (Lazaridis 2011) that aims to protect the national labour market 
exacerbates the poor working and living conditions of work migrants, 
the vast majority of whom migrated to Slovenia from former Yugoslav 
republics. We debate the current massive layoffs of migrant workers 
caused by the closing of companies which forced many to cope with 
the most difficult working and living conditions and led to the return of 
many of them to their countries of birth. We analyse particularities of the 
Slovenian labour market which has recently witnessed the bankruptcy of 
companies that to a large extend depended on cheap migrant labour, 
often exploited to the extent that invited analogies with “modern slavery” 
(Medica et al. 2011). Furthermore, to fully assess the current migration 
management (Kofman 2009) in Slovenia and its implications for migrants 
and society at large, we consult a recent analysis of public opinion that 
supports the “dualist” perception of migrants: pragmatic attitudes which 
recognize the value of migrant labour for the economy, as contrasted 
with xenophobic attitudes according to which migrants are projected 
as a “social threat.” Also, we address the emerging attitudes of solidarity 
with migrants that have been mushrooming during the last three years, 
importantly embodying hope for the future. 
The theoretical framework behind our analysis draws on the notion of 
citizenship as proposed by those authors who conceptualize it in broader 
terms of democratization processes and equalization of people through 
their activity within a polity (cf. Arendt 1967; more recently Isin 2002; Balibar 
2004). Citizenship analysis in a migration context most often refers to the 
locus classicus of modern debates about citizenship, i.e. to Marshall’s 
(1950) conceptualization of citizenship based on political, civil and social 
rights.2 Conceptualized as a status, citizenship in migration studies is 
2  Cf. the recent edition of the Slovenian journal Časopis za kritiko znanosti that published a thematic edition 
Citizenship and Citizen’s equality discussing Marshall’s essay.
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often related to questions of naturalization and to integration into social, 
political, economic and cultural contexts of national states (cf. Niesen 
and Huddleston 2009). It refers to the legal provisions that need to be 
fulfilled for one to acquire citizenship of a specific national state (ibid.), or, 
for example, to the right to acquire dual citizenship (Faist 2007) as formal 
and legal membership. In these writings citizenship encompasses formal/
legal stipulations related to – necessarily conditioned to – admission to 
social welfare, the labour market, education, family reunion, etc. Some 
recent studies elaborated diverse criteria (i.e. MIPEX 2011; Bauböck et al. 
2009) to discuss migrants’ inclusion/exclusion in/from citizenship and their 
integration, referring to naturalization policies, access to education, social 
and health care, political participation and so on.
Elsewhere (Pajnik 2007, 2011a) we have argued that the legal, rights-based 
or integration-based conceptualizations of citizenship in migration that 
present an important contribution to the debates at the same time tend 
not to acknowledge enough that status based citizenship or “nationalizing 
citizenship” in Brubaker’s terminology (1996) has exclusionary elements 
inscribed in its very definition. Only a citizen has the right to vote and 
only a citizen has the right to a pension (cf. Handler 2004); consequently, 
migrants are always found to be “conditioned citizens” (Pajnik 2011a). As it 
was shown by theorists of post-national citizenship (Soysal 1994; Habermas 
2001) nation-based citizenship becomes a privilege of “primordial” 
members of a national community. Understood in this way, it produces 
its opposite, i.e. “statelessness” as de facto “otherness” and inequality. 
The simple fact of not belonging to a specific national community, i.e. 
having a passport of a specific national state as is the case with migrant 
population in Slovenia discussed below, generates inequality of non-
citizens. 
It is not the intention of this article to go further into debates about citizenship 
as this would require a different focus. As mentioned, we have done this on 
other occasions (cf. Pajnik 2011a, b; Pajnik 2012; Pajnik and Bajt 2011) where 
we pointed to the inadequacy of those citizenship conceptualizations 
that, explicitly or not, view “passport citizenship” as the ultimate end of 
integration processes. Several authors have addressed citizenship along 
comparable lines in a Slovenian context, showing, for example, how 
Slovenian citizenship was established as “ethnic-citizenship” in an “ethnic-
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democracy” (Zorn 2007) or how it was related to nationalizing practices 
of state-building (Bajt 2005). One of the consequences of such processes 
is the erasure of 1992 when more than 25,000 people were deleted from 
the registry of permanent residents of Slovenia. The majority or at least one 
of the parents of the erased people were born in other former Yugoslav 
republics, which confirms that the erasure was based on ethnic origin. 
Erasure left thousands of people without status, i.e. with no documents, 
social security, health care, right to housing, free movement and the right 
to work (for one of several analyses cf. Kogovšek and Petković 2010).3
Thus, in line with the above mentioned authors we speak of citizenship 
as of something that creates the “worldliness of people” (Arendt 1967), 
their membership of the world that extends beyond ethnic/national 
determinism or labour market utilitarianism, that cherishes the political 
value of citizens and the expression of their deeds and rights in the public 
sphere. In this context citizenship is understood as a precondition that 
enables life and activity within a polity which arises from the network 
of activities of polity members who deliberate on an equal footing as a 
public (Habermas 1989).
Therefore, this article is informed by the studies that endeavour to 
safeguard the democratic aspiration of the concept of citizenship and 
its potential to generate “polities of equals” (cf. Štrajn 2011; Sardoč 2011). 
The empirical case of migrants in Slovenia which we use to explore the 
migration management regime and discuss its implications for “third 
country” migrant workers illustrates a situation that is by no means unique 
to Slovenia. Our case study should be read in broader terms as a reflection 
on what can be called the “decitizenization of migrants,” a trend observed 
across Europe that points to the decline of the idea of political citizenship 
(polity) or the fading of its power to generate equality. In other words, such 
a decline can be seen as opposite to efforts to accommodate diversity 
in European societies that in the context of multiculturalism debates 
Kymlicka (2010, p. 36) has recently termed “democratic citizenization.”.
In this article we therefore use the example of migration polices in Slovenia 
and their effects on migrant workers during the recent period of social 
3 Recently (June 2012) Slovenia was found responsible for violations of rights of the erased people by the Grand 
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turmoil (2008-2012) to problematize the processes of “decitizenization.” 
Particular attention is devoted to nuances in the definitions of migrants 
motivated by the protectionist-prone ideologies of a young state. Since 
we understand citizenship as full participation of people in the activities of 
a political community we are not concerned solely with the institutional 
dimensions of migration policies, but also make room for the migrants’ 
own narratives. We begin by briefly introducing the country’s migration 
history. This is followed by the discussion of the most recent official data 
on the composition of the migrant workforce, permits, (un)employment 
trends among migrant workers, and the sectors in which they work. We 
then proceed to question Slovenia’s current labour policies in relation to 
its overall migration management provisions which leave migrant men 
and women at the outskirts of integration (Balibar 2004). We analyze 
labour market policies that, from migrants’ stories, have proved to be 
the mechanisms for the securitization of national ideologies and, at the 
same time, the insecuritization of migrants. We devote attention to the 
Slovenian anti-crisis “policy package” on migration, combining policy 
analysis with reflections expressed in the interviews. In particular, we draw 
on the interviews and focus groups with migrant women and men from 
Yugoslavia’s successor states who represent the great majority of migrants 
in the country. We discuss their precarious situations in the Slovenian 
labour market to provide a “consulted” analysis of the current trends of 
decitizenization of migrants and constructions that have turned former 
co-nationals into “third country nationals”. 
One could argue that we cannot possibly speak of “decitizenization” as 
the majority of migrant workers that we consider were never Slovenian 
citizens and could therefore not be “decitizenized.” But the true meaning 
of the decitizenization processes in contemporary societies across Europe 
lies precisely in the fact that non-citizens suffer from decitizenization the 
most. Not being recognized as citizens of a polity they appear as “non-
citizens for life”, even if they acquire citizenship. Thus, decitizenization is 
problematized here as a consequence of migration and labour market 
management regimes which turnmigrants intodisposable workers. 
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On sample and method
For our analysis presented below we use data on the migrant population 
in Slovenia, together with an analysis of selective policies. Also, we draw 
on information gathered through interviews and focus group with migrants 
who came to Slovenia from Yugoslavia successor states in the period 
after the year 2000. Considerations about sampling reflect the project for 
which the data has been gathered4 and which analysed labour market 
integration of migrants from “third countries,” and we made every effort 
to incorporate migrant men and women with a great variety of different 
experiences. Although our sample isn’t representative we adjusted it 
according to the actual numbers of “third country” migrants in Slovenia, 
also taking into consideration sectoral and regional distribution. Our 
sample hence also reflects the regional specificities, since most migrants 
from “third countries” are employed in the capital city of Ljubljana and 
around Ljubljana, i.e. in the Osrednjeslovenska region. In terms of the 
sectors where most migrants work, the construction sector is by far the most 
important sector of employment, which is, consequently, mirrored in our 
sample. The sample also reflects the official gender distribution of migrants 
where the vast majority are males, and the actual data of countries of 
birth where majority are found to migrate from former Yugoslav states. 
Between April and November 2009 a total of 18 interviews with migrant 
men (12) and women (6) were conducted. The interviewees could be listed 
according to their country of birth: 12 from the former Yugoslav republics 
(5 from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 3 from Serbia, 3 from Macedonia and 1 
from Kosovo), 2 from Ukraine, 1 from Thailand, 1 from Russia, 1 from Iraq 
and 1 from Zambia. Our respondents are between 26 and 55 years of 
age. The sample includes migrants working in construction, motor traffic, 
restaurants, bars and catering business, health care, the education sector 
and doing seasonal work in agriculture and domestic work. 
The focus group had 6 participants, 4 female and 2 male migrants. 
3 people have previously already been involved with the project as 
4  Data was gathered for the purposes of the project PRIMTS, Prospects for Integration of Migrants from “Third 
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interview partners and 3 people were invited to the focus group as their 
first contact with the project. The focus group participants thus included 
a private entrepreneur from Croatia, a construction worker from Bosnia-
Herzegovina, an unemployed teacher and an unemployed manager, 
both from Ukraine, a maintenance worker from Montenegro, and a 
pharmacist who had recently arrived from Serbia and had so far been 
unable to find employment.
The verbatim transcripts of semi-structured biographical interviews were 
done and analysed in the process of thematic segmentation and thematic 
analysis. Each interview and the focus group debate were analysed to 
allow a nuanced overview of the topics that emerged in individual life 
stories, reflecting the personal experiences of migrants, as well as showing a 
wider trend of the migrants’ positions and situations in relation to migration 
policy. Each interview analysis also included contrastive comparisons with 
other interviews in the sample, thus enabling us to cluster certain themes 
together and reflect on the relevance of particular migrant experiences. 
In this article we will focus on discussing in particular the experiences of 
migrants from the former Yugoslavia. In general our data proves that, 
mostly because of language and cultural proximity, common history, 
migrants from the former Yugoslavia do not experience such barriers as 
migrants who have migrated from Asia or Africa. Still, when it comes to 
their work-related experiences migrants’ stories show several similarities 
that point to a specific rationale of a migration management regime that 
is prone to protect the “national” at the expense of the “foreign.”
Recent migration trends and peculiarities of 
migrant’s work
Slovenia has witnessed an increase in immigration since the early 1990s, 
particularly as a consequence of growing numbers of refugees fleeing 
the war in Bosnia and Croatia and as a consequence of new migration 
trends since the year 2000, when it started to attract migrants from other 
countries, especially from Africa, the former Soviet Union countries, Asia 
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and Latin America. Immigration, however, was not a new trend; Slovenia 
had been a country of immigration already back in the 1960s to the 1980s, 
when migrants from other republics of Yugoslavia moved to Slovenia 
during the times of rapid industrialization and urbanization. Significant 
economic migration to Slovenia began as migrants settled in industrial 
cities across the country, especially in the 1970s when the Western 
European states that had been the primary countries of destination for 
Yugoslav migrants (especially Germany) began to limit immigration. This 
trend has importantly affected the current composition of the migrant 
population, the vast majority of whom come from the former Yugoslav 
republics. The geographical, cultural, and linguistic proximities remain 
the deciding factors, leading former co-nationals to continue migrating 
to Slovenia, although their status has radically changed. From the very 
beginning migration from the south-eastern regions was accompanied by 
social distancing and tensions, resulting from unequal access to sources 
of power (Mežnarić 1986). This situation seems to have deteriorated 
after Slovenia joined the EU and consequently categorized the former 
Yugoslavs as “third country” migrants (Pajnik 2011a; Pajnik and Bajt 2011). 
At the beginning of 2011 4% of Slovenia’s population numbering slightly 
above 2 million in total were foreign citizens (82,746 persons altogether), 
with citizens of Yugoslavia’s successor states representing 87% of the 
total foreign population. However, viewed through the lens of the active 
population, a different picture emerges. The comparison of the number 
of work permits issued to migrants in 2009 (81,105) and the overall number 
of persons in employment in 2009 (858,171), yields a significant share of 
9.5% of foreigners on the Slovenian labour market. Almost half of the entire 
foreign population is from Bosnia-Herzegovina (47%), with a further 11% 
from Macedonia, 9.4% from Croatia and 9.1% from Serbia. Only 3% of 
migrants came from countries outside of Europe; 62% are from Asia. Men 
represent the majority (71%) and women make up 29% of the total foreign 
population. As for migrants’ age, data show that the majority of migrants 
who came to Slovenia during the last decade belong in the age groups 
20–24, 25–29, and 30–34.5
Figures on permanent and temporary resident permits issued in Slovenia 
show that the vast majority of these have been granted to third country 
5 Cf. Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, Statistical Yearbook 2011, available at http://www.stat.si; 
and Employment Service of Slovenia data, available at http://www.ess.gov.si/trg_dela/trg_dela_v_stevilkah/
zaposlovanje_tujcev (15 October 2012).
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migrants for the purpose of employment and work, followed by family 
reunion and study purposes. The number of valid residence permits 
increased by 33% in 2008 compared to 2007, while subsequent years 
affected by the crisis have seen a decrease, which amounts to a decline 
of 18% in 2010 compared to 2008.6 This was the consequence of both 
the changed economic situation, which led to a substantial downsizing 
of companies, and of the Decree on Restrictions and Prohibition of 
Employment and Work of Aliens adopted in 2009, which substantially 
limited the employment and work of third-country migrants in Slovenia.
The Employment Service data show that almost half of all migrant workers, 
mostly citizens of Yugoslavia’s successor states, work in construction, 
a sector that would not be able to function and operate without the 
cheap and hardworking migrant labour force (cf. Medica et al. 2011; 
Pajnik and Bajt 2011). This in itself points to a considerable level of gender 
segregation, since the construction sector is highly masculinised. Being 
considered a 3D sector, it is traditionally shunned by local workers and 
widely recognized as a sector characterized by hard working conditions, 
unsteady work arrangements, low payment, low level of protection of 
workers’ rights and frequent accidents (Ibid.). The construction sector 
is followed by the manufacturing sector in which migrants account for 
13.3% of workers, and the motor traffic and storage sectors with nearly 6% 
of migrant workers; other sectors (i.e. accommodation and food services, 
health services, farming) have much lower shares of migrant labour 
force. Despite substantial recent downsizing, the construction sector is still 
predominately filled by male workers coming from the former Yugoslav 
republics who perform especially hard physical work. Of 74,008 valid work 
permits in January 2011, 37% were issued for work in construction. It should 
be noted, however, that the number of valid work permits decreased 
to merely 34,221 in December 2011. Partly the reason for change is the 
adoption of the new Employment and Work of Aliens Act in April 2011 that 
enables free access to the labour market to various groups of migrants 
that before needed a work permit, while a significant reason for the 
decrease is the collapse of some of the industries because of the crisis. 
Data shows that migrant women are represented above average among 
the service and sales staffs, while their shares in administrative and 
6 Cf. 2010 Report of the Migration and Integration Directorate, Ministry of the Interior, available at http://www.mnz.
gov.si. (4 September 2012).
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professional jobs and in elementary professions are higher than those of 
men.7 It is also interesting to note a conspicuously gendered distribution 
of migrant women across specific sectors. While Thai migrant women are 
mainly employed in health centres and spas as masseuses, Ukrainian, 
Russian and Moldovan female migrants, for example, mainly work in 
nightclubs, bars, and restaurants. Despite the fact that male migrant 
workers are in much higher demand and consequently represent a 
majority, migrant women in Slovenia have been increasingly filling positions 
within informal sectors of the labour market, particularly invisible domestic 
work, household cleaning and care work which is often performed by 
women who migrated from one of the former Yugoslav republics (Cukut 
2008; Hrženjak 2011). The share of GDP made by undeclared labour in 
Slovenia is estimated differently by different sources. It is reported to be 
between 17 and 25% (Renooy et al. 2004, pp. 25-26) and between 3 to 
21% (Nastav 2009); the latter estimate states that the most reliable figure 
for 2007 was 15.6%, while the Slovenian Chamber of Commerce8 cites 
OECD data that estimate recent grey economy at 28% of GDP. Apart 
from feminized care work, the masculinized construction sector is noted 
as a sector with the highest share of undeclared work.9 Also, according 
to the 2011 Labour inspectorate annual report the number of violations of 
legal provisions related to employment and work of foreigners, specifically 
in the precarious sectors of migrant work, are on the rise in the period from 
2010 to 2011.
Recently many of the largest industries have faced bankruptcy. In 
particular, the construction sector was hit the worst and the closing of 
many companies revealed the reality of bad management, corruption 
coupled with takeovers and the privatization of profits by the owners at the 
expense of workers, all of which resulted in massive layoffs. Consequently, 
the official unemployment rate for Slovenia has been on the rise in the 
last years; it has risen from 6.7% in 2008 to 11.8% in 2010, while unofficial 
estimates that take into account the level of poverty point to even higher 
figures. According to Bauman’s (2005) categories, in general the numbers 
of the “new poor” are on the rise. The number of unemployed migrants is 
7 Statistical Office of the RS, Statistical Yearbooks 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 http://www.stat.si (29 September 
2012).
8Cf. http://www.gzs.si (26 October 2012).
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hard to decipher from the official data and is not representative as only 
the holders of personal work permits can register with the Employment 
Service as unemployed. Employment Service10 data shows an increase 
in unemployed migrants if we compare figures for 2009 and 2010, and 
the majority of these are migrants from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, 
Croatia, Macedonia and Kosovo. The end of 2009 saw 1,606 registered 
unemployed migrants from Bosnia-Herzegovina, with this number rising to 
2,920 at the end of 2010. 
Labour market ideologies and implications for 
migrants
Work permits and quotas: securitizing the market, insecuritizing 
the migrants
In terms of legal stipulations and policy provisions, it has to be noted that 
EU nationals formally have equal access to the labour market in Slovenia 
as the native-born population, whereas access for migrants from third 
countries is tightly regulated, specifically by work permits and the quota 
system. It had been expected by politicians and advocated in the media 
that the number of migrant workers would steadily rise after Slovenia’s 
accession to the EU. Consequently, in 2004 Slovenia set a quota on work 
permits which could be issued to third country migrants, with the highest 
allowed share of foreign workers set to 5% of the active population of 
Slovenia. Within this overall framework, annual numerical limits were fixed 
depending on the economic situation. In light of the economic downturn 
which hit Slovenia harder than most other OECD countries (a drop in GDP 
in 2009 by more than 8%) the upper limit was reduced from 32,000 in 2008 
to 24,000 in 2009, and further to 12,000 in 2010, which translates into a 62.5% 
decrease during the last two years. According to the new Employment 
and Work of Aliens Act from 2011, quotas are not binding any longer. 
In the new diction of the act, the government “may” prescribe quotas, 
meaning that these are no longer a necessity, and none have been set 
10 Cf. http://www.ess.gov.si/ (20 October 2012).
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for the years 2011 and 2012, obviously due to a massive return of migrants 
as a consequence of layoffs and bankruptcies. Clearly, quotas were not 
abolished in an attempt to increase the security of migrants. Rather, none 
have been set because of huge layoffs, meaning that there is no “fear” 
any longer that the number of migrants would exceed the 5 percent share 
of the active native workforce, which points to the protectionist nature of 
Slovenian migration policy. 
Our sample includes two migrants who had worked and lived in Slovenia 
in the past, before their current migration experience. Fikret and Milutin 
came to Slovenia for the first time in 1987 and 1977, respectively. At 
that time, Slovenia was still part of Yugoslavia, so they were internal 
migrants from other federal republics (Fikret from Bosnia and Milutin from 
Serbia) and they both worked at the railways. Interestingly, both fondly 
remember their prior migration experience and life in Slovenia, describing 
it as much better than it is today. In his narrative Milutin frequently referred 
to the great times he had in Slovenia when he served in the military and 
later when he began to work. However, they have less fond memories 
of their present-day, work-related experiences. Both Fikret, who works 
as a construction worker, and Milutin, who works as a bus driver, refer to 
similar problems arising from difficult work conditions, miserable salaries, 
payment problems, and employers’ dreadful attitudes unlike those they 
knew in the past. 
Apart from the quota system, it is the type of work permit that strongly 
influences migrants’ general and employment positions. Three main 
types of work permits are issued to migrants from third countries and their 
peculiarities changed in 2011 with the changes of the Employment and 
Work of Aliens Act: a) personal work permit, b) employment permit, and 
c) permit for work. Work permits are habitually issued on an employer’s 
demand under the condition of a lack of suitable domestic workers. A 
positive change since 2011 is that personal work permits that are issued 
with a three year validity period are applicable to several additional 
groups of migrants (like family members of foreigners with a permanent 
residence permit). A valid personal work permit enables migrants the 
most flexibility, i.e. access to the labour market without further restrictions, 
except if it is issued for one year for self-employment. Employment permits 
must be obtained by the employer before a migrant enters Slovenia and 
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are dependent on the absence of suitable registered unemployed native 
workforce. while the migrant can only be employed by an employer who 
obtained the permit and can only perform work for which the permit 
was issued. Permits for work are meant for referred or appointed workers, 
movement of persons within an enterprise, education and training in 
Slovene enterprises for managers, training, contractual services, and, 
most importantly, for seasonal jobs in agriculture and forestry. The permits 
for work allow a migrant to work only for the designated employer. The 
residence permits which are tied to the validity of work permits continue 
to be a mechanism that has proven to worsen migrants’ positions in the 
labour market. 
Employment Service data show that the number of valid work permits 
(i.e. permits that have actually been issued to migrants) has been on the 
rise since 2005; in 2008 there were more than 90,000 valid permits which 
was an increase of 52% compared to 2005. The increase was related to 
larger demands for migrant workers to fill in labour shortages, specifically 
in the then booming construction sector. Numbers for 2009−2011 point to 
a decrease in the number of permits due to recession and new policies 
aimed at the protection of native workers. Data also shows that the 
number of issued work permits (i.e. new permits that have been granted 
to migrants) has been on the rise during the period between 2000 and 
2008, and that the majority of all permits were employment permits, 
meaning that the majority of migrants were tied to one employer with 
scarce or no opportunities to change their status. A steep decline in the 
number of issued work permits has been noted during the recession period 
2008–2010; in 2010, 38,204 work permits were issued, i.e. 55% less than in 
2008. This can be explained as related to substantial downsizing within 
the construction sector. It can be deduced from this data that during 
the recession period migrants from third countries who had resided in 
Slovenia for a longer period and have fulfilled the conditions for obtaining 
a personal work permit remained in Slovenia, while many who had 
temporary jobs or short-term contracts with no guaranteed renewal and 
with limited social protection lost their jobs and consequently returned to 
their countries of birth. 
In general, the narratives of our interviewees revealed the extent to 
which their status determined their overall position in the Slovenian labour 
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XV
III (67) - 2012
36
market and consequently their access to various welfare provisions. The 
work permit that binds migrants to one specific employer was recognized 
as a serious problem in these narratives. Men employed in construction 
predominantly described how they entered the labour market under the 
auspices of one employer that initially promised great things, particularly 
a high salary, but failed to deliver any of these. Fatlindi, for instance, who 
came to Slovenia from Kosovo, experienced poor working and living 
conditions, but being tied to his employer who took advantage of all 
employees he had to endure precarious job conditions without social 
insurance and now felt cheated out of what was rightfully his. His story is an 
exemplary “model” of how profound the consequences of an employer’s 
failure to follow the regulations are. Not only did Fatlindi lose three years of 
rights related to social security, but now he even fears that he might have 
problems with proving that he continuously resided in Slovenia, which he 
has to do in order to be entitled to certain welfare provisions. 
The legal provisions defining different migrant statuses, which are also 
characterized by frequent changes, are connected with the way in which 
a person enters Slovenia (e.g. as a work migrant, refugee or marriage 
migrant) and with the type of work they perform (e.g. contractual, 
seasonal, self-employment, etc.). For example, Ali, a 42 year old migrant 
from Iran, had a special refugee status that is associated with rights that 
are officially almost equal to those of Slovenian citizens. This means that 
he had the right to search for a job and he was also entitled to social 
assistance, registration with the Employment Service and unemployment 
benefits. However, even though he officially had the same rights as 
citizens, Ali still had to resort to illicit work since as a “foreigner” he was 
not able to obtain a job. Also, his chances of employment are in general 
slimmer because of employers’ suspicious attitudes towards “unknown” 
migrants with whom they cannot communicate in Slovenian, Croatian or 
Bosnian language. Moreover, several of our interview partners said that 
their work contracts were to expire at the end of 2009, so they worried 
if these would be prolonged, and if not, whether they would be able to 
find a new job. Milutin was sceptical and uneasy about his chances. On 
the other hand, Abdić, a 29 year old self-employed construction worker 
who migrated from Bosnia, was plagued by different kinds of problems 
connected with his self-employment status, e.g. regular payment of his 
workers, constant securing of sufficient work to cover all the expenses, 
handling of clients who are late with their payments, etc. 
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Not being able to obtain a work permit drives migrants to work on the black 
market. Fatima, who migrated from Bosnia and works undocumented as 
a cleaner, explains how nobody wanted to hire her because she did not 
have a work permit. She’s terrified over the burden she’s been carrying 
for not working legally, namely the fear of being discovered, prosecuted 
and deported. Our interviews with women migrants have revealed 
the exhaustion of many who, beside the work they perform in difficult 
conditions, are double-burdened with domestic work at home while 
several also reported taking care of their sick relatives in Slovenia or, from 
a distance, in their country of birth.
The above presented data on work permits and quotas as well as interviews 
with migrants point to a conclusion that migrants’ work arrangements are 
more unstable, of a shorter duration and more vulnerable to abuse than 
those of the Slovenian citizens. The majority of migrants end up with having 
short-term contracts, while fixed-term contracts (full or part time) are still 
a predominant employment pattern for citizens, although the recent 
drastic saving measures adopted by the government are expected to 
change this soon. Our interviews with migrants showed that the reason for 
taking short-term jobs and accepting bad working arrangements is the 
absence of other options. Lack of opportunities for stable jobs has also 
been observed with Slovenian workers. However, the information obtained 
through interviews makes it possible to conclude that fewer migrants than 
those with citizenship status are in a position to refuse a job on grounds of 
“not wanting to perform the kind of work that is being offered.” 
Anti-crisis measurements: restriction and retroactivity of 
policies 
The recent changes in employment policies compounded by the wider 
negative attitude towards migrants in Slovenia spurred by the global 
recession and protective policies of the state, put migrants in an even 
more marginalised and precarious position. Undoubtedly, making 
migrants’ labour dependent on the interests of the national economy is 
not a new approach; quotas and different types of work permits discussed 
above are examples of mechanisms that are used not only in Slovenia 
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but elsewhere as well to control the need for migrant work. However, the 
crisis has led to the introduction of certain additional control measures. 
The document Rules on work permits, on registration and de-registration 
of work and on the supervision of the employment and work of aliens, 
adopted in 2009, includes, among other things, a stipulation that allows 
the employment of “third country nationals” only if no appropriately 
trained unemployed Slovenian citizens are available to fill a specific job 
position. This is in contrast to the previous rule which made it possible to 
issue an employment permit for a job within an understaffed field without 
checking the potential availability of native workers. The government 
justified this change as part of its recent measures adopted to combat 
recession, i.e. the protection of jobs of “Slovenian nationals.” 
Among the reasons for introducing the new Employment and Work of 
Aliens Act in 2011 the government stressed the need to “regulate better 
the labour market,” specifically to prevent the alleged abuses of the law 
in previous years caused by a trend of setting up companies to obtain 
work and residence permits in Slovenia which were then used by migrants 
to travel to other countries of the Schengen area. Such “abuses,” which 
can alternatively be viewed as survival strategies of certain migrants, 
were already counteracted in 2009 with the Decree on restrictions and 
prohibition of employment and work of aliens and with the quota for 2010. 
The Decree included a ban on employment in seasonal work within 
all sectors except agriculture and forestry and a prohibition of issuing 
new permits for “representatives of micro and small companies and 
for representatives of branch offices” for foreigners from Kosovo. 
Symptomatically, the government justified the new Act that introduced 
harsher conditions for migrants who wanted to set up a company by 
stressing not only the need to “protect” its “native” labourers, but also 
the need to “increase the general protection of migrant workers.” Also, it 
has to be noted that workers coming to Slovenia from EU member states 
are not subject of protectionist policies. Transposing EU provisions Slovenia 
needed to equalize their chances to compete on the labour market. 
Another probable reason why policies have not been mobilized towards 
EU workers in Slovenia – unlike in some other EU member states that limited 
migrant flows from Eastern Europe – lies in the fact that the numbers of EU 
migrants in Slovenia compared to “third country” migrants are negligible. 
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Our sample included several examples that show how the protectionist 
measures affected the position of migrants. The global crisis is increasingly 
used as a readymade excuse that diverts attention from poor management 
by giving xenophobic reassurances that the “native-born” workforce is 
of greater importance. The interviews with migrants showed that they 
were the first in line to lose jobs regardless of their unfavourable working 
arrangements. This has made many workers who have succumbed to 
the self-will of their employers afraid of not being able to keep their work 
permits. Several interview partners confirmed that an immediate effect of 
this measure was the worsening of their work-related options; namely, it 
became harder to get any kind of job, even for a short period. It has been 
observed that new policies increased the vulnerability of migrant workers, 
specifically by making them more dependent on the self-will of their 
employers, and that they were perpetuating racism and discrimination. 
The story by Aki, a maintenance worker from Montenegro, revealed how 
his employer differentiated among workers and assigned jobs depending 
on worker’s nationality. As a result, the Slovenes get to perform works 
that are physically not so heavy and also get work which require some 
learning and obtainment of additional skills. Bosnians, Montenegrins and 
Serbs performed physically heavier jobs, and also the boss didn’t bother 
to instruct them how to do certain jobs as he only chose to instruct Slovene 
workers, no matter of the quality of results of their work. The working 
conditions and workloads also varied, with migrants being assigned 
heavier workloads and having to endure worse working conditions than 
the native population. Aki further described how his employer did not 
tolerate any objection or questioning of his rationale, and how one could 
be fired for speaking up. 
Certain policy changes did represent a move in a positive direction, but 
only tentatively, since none of these measures have been taken with the 
intention to protect migrants. One among the novelties introduced by the 
new Act allows a migrant to obtain a personal work permit for three years 
based on her/his uninterrupted employment for the period of 20 months 
at least, enabling the migrant to change the employer. In the past to be 
entitled to obtain a personal work permit a migrant had to be employed 
by the same employer for at least two years. This all-important change 
was brought about by media pressure and public visibility of various 
research findings and of trade union activities which have exposed the 
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dependency of migrants (cf. Medica et al. 2011). As a matter of fact, during 
2010 the media extensively reported on the miserable working and living 
conditions of migrants, specifically highlighting the slave-like conditions 
endured by construction workers coming from the former Yugoslav states. 
The situation of refugees and migrants with permanent residence has also 
seen a slight improvement: according to new provisions they can freely 
access the labour market without needing to apply for a work permit. 
The law further declares that the labour market is freely accessible to 
immediate family members of Slovene citizens. 
The Aliens Act was also amended in the autumn of 2011. Among the 
important changes is a provision stating that migrants, after losing their 
jobs, can stay in the country for additional three months based on their 
registration with the Employment Agency, meaning that temporary 
residence permits are prolonged for three months and migrants are not 
forced to leave the country immediately. Furthermore, it is expected that 
family members would not have to wait for one year to join the primary 
migrant, as they had to do in the past. The new law is also advocated as a 
change that is expected to increase the protection of illegally employed 
workers. Namely, those willing to testify in court against their employer 
might be granted residence permits.
Some actors such as trade unions and NGOs welcomed the changes, 
although these were introduced very late, i.e. when the economic crisis 
had already struck and many migrants left Slovenia, rather than some time 
ago, when greater protection of migrants was badly needed. It seems 
that the economic reality and its negative impacts on migration trends 
have overtaken changes in migration policies, which is a worrisome trend 
(Medica et al. 2011, p. 96). The response has obviously been sluggish, with 
policies being introduced only after the situation on the labour market 
had already dramatically changed. The new stipulations drew criticism 
particularly from the Invisible Workers of the World who argued for a more 
holistic approach to address migrants’ living and working conditions.11
11  Cf. http://www.njetwork.org/ (25 September 2012).
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Public perceptions, discrimination and solidarity action
Research (Pajnik 2008; Kralj 2008) has shown stereotypical and often 
exclusionary practices of media reporting about migrants and migration 
in Slovenia. The recent (2010–12) heavy exploitation of migrant workers 
has, however, caused a shift in media reporting, leading some of the 
media to initiate debates on the exploitation of migrant workers. A notable 
trend, however, shouldn’t be interpreted as a generally favourable 
attitude supported by media and public discourses overall. For example, 
it is a worrisome trend that the country has seen a rise in the number of 
“patriotic” (i.e. nationalistic) organisations and movements that promote 
openly discriminatory and racist attitudes, and new media increasingly 
appeared as facilitators of their organization. Recently, the arguments 
of these extremist organisations have found their way into mainstream 
political discourse as certain politicians use discriminatory populist rhetoric 
to gain public support. 
Interestingly, recent reports on public opinion surveys point to a “dualism” 
in perceptions of migrants and migration. On the one hand, pragmatism 
related to economic interests has been detected, leading respondents 
to welcome migrants as needed labourers who contribute to economic 
stability and growth. On the other hand, distancing towards migrants 
is clearly visible, with migrants seen as a “social threat” to the local 
population (Zavratnik 2011; Kralj 2011). Surveys have detected a rise in the 
number of respondents who think that Slovenia needs migrant workers to 
fill vacancies in understaffed sectors – in 2007, 36% of respondents were 
of this opinion compared to 45% in 2010 (Kralj 2011, pp. 287–288). Also, 
the percentage of those who think that migrant workers are a burden for 
the state has seen a steep decline – it fell from 43% in 2007 to 24% in 2010 
(ibid.); this can be attributed to the impact of media reporting that was 
supportive towards migrants’ struggle for decent life and just earnings. 
At the same time the survey shows that the share of those who think 
that migrant workers decrease the value of domestic labour force has 
remained high and even increased from 55% in 2007 to 60% in 2010 (ibid.).
Researchers (Kralj 2011, pp. 289–291; Zavratnik 2011, p. 67) report that a 
high percentage of respondents were in favour of restrictive migration 
policies: in 2010; 52% of them claimed that Slovenia needed a stricter 
immigration policy. Interestingly, the study (Kralj 2011) has found that a 
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large share of respondents supported the statement that Slovenia should 
make efforts towards becoming an open, tolerant and multicultural 
society – 76% in 2010, which is an increase up from 63% in 2007. Furthermore, 
44% of respondents agreed that migrants contributed to the shaping of 
a multicultural environment (25% disagreed with this statement), which 
is an increase by 7% compared to 2007, when this percentage stood 
at 37%. A clear discrepancy has been observed between the general 
claims that demonstrate general support for the development of an 
open, multicultural society, on the one hand, and calls for a repressive 
and selective migration policy. In 2010, 60% of respondents agreed 
that migrants should be included in the national labour market on an 
equal footing with the domestic population. On the other hand, a large 
proportion of respondents thought that migrants could not claim the 
same rights as the natives (54% in 2007, down to 44% in 2010). 
Analyses of survey data point to a controversy within the debate on 
migrant integration: “Yes, we want to have an open society” vs. “No, 
migrants shouldn’t participate on an equal footing with the natives.” The 
data measuring social distance show that 51% of respondents would not 
mind having migrants as neighbours; according to the 2008 SPOS12 survey 
(the leading Slovenian social survey project) 28% respondents stated that 
they would not want to have migrants as neighbours.
We have shown how the recent socio-economic-political situation can be 
used as a backdrop to enforce problematic state policies that negatively 
influence democratization processes, reinforce the gaps between the 
“citizens” and “non-citizens” and that can play an important role in 
legitimizing racism and discrimination. Our interview partners offered 
many examples of unfair treatment. For example, Bukefal, a medical 
doctor from Macedonia, who had performed low-skilled, physical, 
undocumented work, explained how he was not considered a regularly 
employed hospital worker simply because of his migrant status. Although 
he performed the same work as his Slovenian colleagues who received 
a salary, and although he had as many working hours as they did and 
invested just as much effort, he could only work as a “volunteer.” Similarly, 
Ali was critical of discrimination and exclusion at the work place. He gave 
12 Cf. Reports of the Slovenian Public Opinion Survey (SPOS), a project of the Public Opinion and Mass Communication 
Research Centre at the Faculty of Social Sciences are available at http://www.cjm.si (28 November 2012).
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XV
III (67) - 2012
43
the example of his former co-worker who did not speak Slovene but his 
superiors nevertheless talked to him in Slovene, putting his colleague in an 
uncomfortable position. Several interview partners spoke of being treated 
unfairly and with obvious disdain. For one of our respondents this became 
simply unbearable so he quit. The last straw for Milutin was his employer’s 
invitation for a drink and meal, accompanied with a remark that they 
finally had a chance to eat a proper meal. For him, this was the worst insult 
he could imagine, especially because in his country of birth, Serbia, they 
were never short of food. When he and his colleagues decided to quit on 
grounds that they no longer wanted to work for such an employer, the 
employer was stunned and even offered them a raise in salary, but they 
refused to stay.
Importantly, during the last two years, similar kinds of life experiences have 
found their place in the media, unlike in the past. In addition, we have 
witnessed a rise in actions that expressed solidarity with migrants who 
suffered from exploitative work and living conditions. Recently, a trade 
union, several NGOs, the Invisible Workers of the World (IWW) initiative13 
and several individuals working in different sectors publicly stood up for 
the rights of migrant workers in a move aimed to improve their precarious 
statuses. Other related activities have taken on various forms, ranging from 
visible public discussions and analysis, street protests and online petitions 
against the poor treatment of workers in various sectors of economy such 
as construction and manufacturing, to humanitarian actions undertaken 
to alleviate the hardships of realpeople, media conferences, work with 
migrant workers to stimulate self-organization, etc. 
In 2010, several groups of migrants working for different companies, many 
of which were linked to the construction sector, started to self-organize and 
raise their voices against the miserable work conditions and work-related 
exploitation, staging several protests including a hunger strike. One such 
action was the strike at the port of Koper in 2011 organised by the trade 
union of crane operators, which was followed by a spontaneous rebellion 
of workers employed by external providers of port services.14 Below we 
13  The Slovenian IWW network that defines itself as the “biosyndicate initiative” is part of the global movement of the 
IWW. See http://www.njetwork.org/ (25 November 2012).
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include the statement of the Union of Subcontractor Workers at the port 
of Koper which illustrates well the daily struggle of many migrants working 
in similar sectors across the country. Their account was also corroborated 
by the narratives of our interview partners.
We don’t have regular working time, so we have to be at the disposal 
of our employers 24 hours per day, seven days a week, every month, 
throughout the year. At any time. We don’t have a work schedule, we 
have to be available “on demand.” We have to respond to the call of 
the employer within one hour. When we arrive at work, we don’t know 
when the work will be finished. We are quite often obliged to work several 
shifts in a row, sometimes as many as 4 shifts, which translates into 32 
hours of continuous work. Sometimes we even have to work 10 successive 
shifts, meaning that we have to work continuously for 3 to 4 days. ... The 
total number of working hours of an individual worker amounts to 250 per 
month, in accordance with the needs of the port, but often we make up 
to 300 or even 350 hours per month.
The same “flexibility” that governs “regular working time” is also applied 
when it comes to payment for work. Work contracts, usually printed on 
pre-defined forms, are incomplete, since they do not include provisions 
on bonus payments. This means that overtime work is paid at the same 
rate as regular work, from 2.5 to 4 euros per hour. Employers do not pay 
our transport expenses, and our food expenses are “paid” with vouchers 
redeemable in the port canteen (worth 3 to 4 euros). Our income on payrolls 
is accounted as follows: the salary is shown as the prescribed minimum 
wage for regular working hours, and the payment for overtime work is 
presented as transport expenses (even if the worker lives only 200 meters 
from the port) and additional payment for a separate household and 
food expenses (in the maximum amount). ... We are constantly exposed 
to mobbing on the part of our employers as well as workers employed 
directly by Luka Koper. Any expression of discontent or resistance, even 
to illegal orders, is sanctioned with temporary or permanent removal from 
the work place (they force us to quit). Such circumstances force workers 
into obedience, especially those who work under a temporary work 
contract or have a temporary work permit. 
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Conclusions
If citizenship refers to the equalization process in contemporary societies, 
then migration management, exemplified through the case of Slovenia, 
points to a decline in citizenship. If citizenship refers to the process of 
“citizenization” of people, the shaping of citizens and non-citizens as 
political beings, where societies aim at fostering exchange between 
different people in the public sphere on an equal footing and are attentive 
to secure solidarity as a principle of action in the polity, then we have been 
experiencing the process of “decitizenization.” Migrants are confronted 
with what can be called “the strategy of circular conditioning” (Pajnik 
2011a). They are subjected to various condition-setting mechanisms, such 
as work permits, residence permits and citizenship status, all of which 
make their work and general life options in a given society insecure. 
Analysis of policies as well as the migrant’s own narrations revealing of the 
effects of policies, point to the fact that despite the transnationalization 
and globalization trends the nationally-embedded frameworks on the 
basis of which policies are formed across the EU still persist (cf. Habermas 
1994). The need to readdress some persistent national ideologies within 
globalizing-national states that are today recognized as de facto 
multicultural societies has become obvious, perhaps more than ever 
in the past. In this article we exposed the persistence of labour market 
ideologies that are intended to limit and prevent migrants’ employment, 
while analysing their rationale and concrete impacts on migrating 
populations. The conditionality of migrants’ lives that is inspired by 
nationalistic protective measurements on the one hand and xenophobic 
attitudes on the other poses further challenges to the idea of citizenship. 
In Slovenia and in several other EU member states migrants experience 
significantly higher levels of unemployment and underemployment than 
“native” workers. While this is allegedly caused by the current economic 
crisis, our research confirms that even during the times of economic 
growth many migrants were unable to make use of their skills, frequently 
working in low-skilled, temporary, and badly paid jobs. Furthermore, “third 
country” migrants are over-represented in informal segments of the labour 
market. Their prominent lack of access to legal employment forces them 
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XV
III (67) - 2012
46
to become undocumented and undeclared workers in order to survive, 
so they experience a higher degree of vulnerability and receive little or no 
legal and social protection. Moreover, employers tend to avoid offering 
migrants stable employment. Rather, they find it more convenient to hire 
a migrant for a short-term period, which is an arrangement that involves 
the lowest level of social security and rights for migrants, and then, after 
the expiration of the work contract, hire a new person. 
The question raised by our analysis is that of the possible ways of envisioning 
citizenship for a globalized world for the future, where the principle of 
equal action among various populations in a polity would be observed 
(cf. Pajnik2011b; Štrajn 2011). We have shown that answers should be 
sought within the solidarity-oriented activities of people who have recently 
engaged in a massive struggle against the contemporary profit-oriented 
management of the elites in our societies. Answers are being shaped 
through actions and movements that deserve our greater attention in 
the future, while we endeavour to find explanations and answers for the 
future courses of our societies and for the citizenization of citizens, where 
the concept of citizens should encompass people in general, citizens and 
non-citizens, including stateless people, alike.
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Mediation of the European Union in 
the Middle East Peace Process
Marijana Musladin1
Abstract
The European Union is one of the most powerful political and economic actors in the world. The EU 
is based on and promotes principles of conflict prevention and resolution, internally as well as in its 
external relations. With a great number of political, economic and military instruments at hand and 
with its presence in more than 130 countries worldwide the EU is in a position to play a proactive 
role in peacemaking efforts. So, the term “international peace mediation” needs to be qualified 
when used to describe the role of the EU in the Middle East Peace Process.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the EU’s role in the Middle East Peace Process and to research 
whether the mediation of the EU contributed to the stabilization of the situation in the Middle East. 
The focus of the research is on the instruments that the EU uses in the international peace media-
tion, specifically on the instruments it uses in the mediation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
KEY WORDS:
EU, Middle East Peace Process, mediation, international peace mediation.
1 Correspondence to: marijana.musladin@unidu.hr
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Introduction
‘’ The European Union is one big mediation and conflict resolution machine, 
based on law and non-stop negotiations. This puts us in a position to not 
only advocate preventive diplomacy, but also to implement it.’’ (Javier 
Solana). 
In the past mediation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was unilateral 
in character and dominated by the United States. Until the 1990s the 
European Union was mostly interested in economic cooperation with 
countries in the Middle East, but not in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. In the regional policy of the European Union by the 1990s the 
Middle East was looked at in the context of the wider Mediterranean area. 
Potentially, the Arab League2 was the most appropriate institution with 
which the EU could agree on economic cooperation without interfering 
in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
However, the specificity and longevity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
and the desire to strengthen its own reputation have prompted the EU to 
try to impose itself as a mediator in the conflict. 
The turning point in the politics of the European Union was marked by 
the negotiations between Israel and the PLO in Oslo in 1993. The EU 
concentrated on creating the conditions on the ground that would ensure 
the coexistence of the parties to the conflict and provide the necessary 
socio-economic conditions for lasting peace and stability in the Middle 
East. For the European Union the Palestinian Authority (PA) represented 
the player that needed maximum assistance in the region considering 
that it was not an equal enough partner with Israel in the Peace Process. 
Since 1993 the EU has been the largest donor of financial and technical 
assistance to the PA and the Peace process as a whole.3
2 The Arab League (officially called the “League of Arab States”) is a regional organisation of Arab states in North 
and Northeast Africa, and Southwest Asia (Middle East). It was established in 1945 and has 22 members: Algeria, 
Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. To view more details check: 
www.arab.de/arabinfo/league.htm.
3 In recent yearsthe contribution of the European Commission and EU Member States has reached –1 billion per year.
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Currently, one of the strategic priorities of the European Union’s foreign 
policy is to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Without achieving this 
goal there will be little chance of solving other problems in the Middle East 
(http://ec.europa.eu/).
However, since the beginning of development of the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) at Maastricht, which entered into force in 1993, 
the EU has supported or participated in all international efforts to resolve 
important issues between Israelis and Palestinians. Research will show if 
the policies of the European Union have been successful in this plan.
Mediation and international peace mediation
As the conflict is part of everyday life, mediation can be and is practiced 
every day and everywhere. Simply put, it is a way of reaching decisions 
in a cooperative way, allowing for clear and open communication 
processes. Conflicts can be resolved in a formal manner through courts, 
arbitration, diplomacy and mediation, or in an informal manner through 
friends, colleagues, religious and community leaders, and through 
dialogue (Herrberg, 2008:8). The way in which people resolve their disputes 
has an impact on how societies and institutions are governed, as well 
as on their ability to resolve conflicts with and within other communities. 
So, mediation often means different things to different people, even 
in a relatively homogenous setting – which in this case is the EU policy 
community. There are many definitions of mediation. Mediation is an 
informal and confidential way for people to resolve disputes with the 
help of a neutral mediator who is trained to help people discuss their 
differences. The mediator does not decide who is right or wrong or issues 
a decision. Instead, the mediator helps the parties work out their own 
solutions to problems (http://www.eeoc.gov/employees/mediation.cfm). 
Further, mediation is defined as a confidential and informal way to resolve 
a dispute with the help of a neutral third person (mediator). The mediator 
works with both parties to help them reach a mutually agreeable solution 
to their differences (Mediation - Alaska Bar Association). According to the 
Law.com Dictionary: “mediation is the attempt to settle a legal dispute 
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through active participation of a third party (mediator) who works to find 
points of agreement and make those in conflict agree on a fair result”.
For the purpose of this research the most appropriate definition is 
that mediation is a third party assisted or third party initiated and led 
communication between representatives of conflict parties in order to 
bring them to direct talk to be able to discuss issues, reach an agreement 
and make common decisions.
Mediation and dialogue are often used in different ways by different actors 
or interchangeably. But, there is a difference. Unlike mediation, in which 
the goal is usually reaching a resolution or settlement of a dispute, the 
goal of dialogue is usually simply improving interpersonal understanding 
and trust. Dialogue is open-ended communication between conflict 
parties that is facilitated or moderated by a third party in order to 
foster mutual recognition, understanding, empathy and trust (Herrberg, 
2009: 14). Dialogue and facilitation are thus less directive approaches 
than mediation. However, mediation and dialogue have very similar 
communication processes.
Mediation is widely recognized as an effective instrument in national and 
international conflict resolution, utilized by a variety of state, non-state 
and multilateral actors and agencies at different levels in the international 
system, and to different ends. Maintaining international peace and 
security is one key area where mediation gets utilized frequently, with 
varying degrees of success (Herrberg; Gündüz; Davis, 2009). For Antje 
Herrberg, international peace mediation is complicated and situation-
specific, especially in terms of supporting all parties in conflict to keep 
mutual balance and symmetry (Herrberg, 2008:10). 
In this globalized world the word “international” may indeed be redundant. 
It is used because international conflicts refer both to interstate and 
intrastate conflicts. But the environment, the abuse of human rights and 
likely changes in the global order, are all concerns of the international 
community and thus provide a rationale for mediation. The term “peace” 
refers specifically to a sustainable, enduring resolution to conflict. It therefore 
attaches a value to international mediation as an integral – not isolated – 
part in the conflict-resolution and peace-building cycle (Herrberg, 2008:9).
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The EU is one of the most powerful political and economic actors in the 
world. In addition to bilateral relations with countries and regions in all 
continents the EU also operates delegations in all corners of the world – 
there is a network of over 130 EU delegations and offices (http://www.
eeas.europa.eu/index_en.htm). 
The term “international peace mediation” is used here to describe engagement 
in interstate conflicts by an outside actor - the EU. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
is not only one of the “most enduring and explosive of all the world’s conflicts” 
(BBC News, 2010), but it also constitutes one of the first foreign policy projects of 
the EU and is characterised accordingly by decades of European involvement.
Overview of EU Mediation-Related Instruments and 
Mechanisms
The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU has been 
developed since 1993. The main objective is to formulate and implement 
a common policy in dealing with foreign policy and security issues. The 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), formerly known as the 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)4, is a major element of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union and is the 
domain of EU policy covering defence and military aspects.
Throughout the history of the EU a common foreign policy has always 
been a complex policy field. This is in part because foreign policy is still 
seen as part of a Member State’s sovereignty. The CFSP is decided by the 
27 Member States. Member States have different opinions and traditions 
regarding some regions of the world, often rendering a common position 
difficult (Middle East, East Europe).5
4 The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) aims to strengthen the EU’s external ability to act through the 
development of civilian and military capabilities in Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management. The Treaty of Lisbon 
(2009) renamed the ESDP to Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The post of High Representative 
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has been created (superseding the High Representative for 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Commissioner for External Relations and European 
Neighbourhood Policy). See full text of the Treaty: http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/full_text/index_en.htm
5 There are some changes after the Lisbon Treaty - High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy is also the Vice 
President of the European Commission, which ensures consistency and coordination of EU external action. 
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However, within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) there 
are political and financial instruments that the EU uses in the mediation 
of security. Broadly speaking, these can be summarised as follows (EU 
political instruments with relevance for international peace mediation):
 - High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
(currently Catherine Ashton) - support to the Council on matters 
relating to CFSP and support to implementation of CSFP- related 
decisions by the Council; participation in troika missions and leading 
on political dialogue with third countries.
 - Council Common Positions - circumscribe shared foreign policy 
positions by EU Member States, including in conflict-affected 
countries; could serve to stimulate mediation-focused foreign 
policy approaches and stimulate member states efforts in the same 
direction.
 - Council Joint Actions - taken by member states on behalf of the 
EU; can include suspension of diplomatic relations, imposition of 
sanctions, initiation of different types of EU missions.
 - EU Special Representatives and Envoys - special Envoys can conduct 
assessment missions for the EU and can recommend courses of 
action for the EU on how to support specific peace processes, 
financially or technically; EUSRs can be nominated by the Council 
for specific regions or countries to assist, facilitate and contribute to 
ongoing peace processes; may or may not have explicit mediation 
mandates; ensure open communication channels between parties 
and Brussels/ Member States.
 - Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit - assists with monitoring, 
analysis and assessment of international developments; receives 
political reports from EC Delegations around the world.
 - EC Delegations - provide analysis and reporting on third country 
political and other developments; implement external assistance; 
provide logistical support to different types of EU missions and high-
level visits; maintain networks and contacts with in-country political, 
economic and civil society actors.
 - Troika visits - provide continuity to EU engagement, including 
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current, preceding and upcoming Member-State Presidencies of 
the Council; can conduct dialogues with third countries on behalf 
of the EU; opportunity for high-level political engagement by the EU 
in a mediation process, drawing on Member-State capacities.
 - Various EC Commission funding instruments, Instrument for Stability 
(previously the Rapid Reaction Mechanism) - can provide financial 
assistance to “international and regional organisations, state and 
non-state actors,” including for mediation efforts, negotiations, 
and monitoring and implementation of ceasefire and peace 
agreements through the Mediation and Policy Advice Facility. This 
can include: financial assistance to third parties mediation efforts; 
allowing parties to participate in mediation efforts; and funding 
technical support or mediation support efforts (Herrberg, Gündüz, 
Davis: 2009:10).
Components of the CFSP that are important to consider for the purposes 
of this paper are: the ESDP “pillar” which includes peacekeeping and 
crisis management missions, the High Representative for the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, EU Special Representatives (EUSRs), Council 
Common Positions and Council Joint Actions. The Council regularly adopts 
the conclusions of the peace process in the Middle East and common 
positions6 and actions. 
Towards the end of 2005 the EU adopted Joint Actions setting up two 
ESDP missions in the Palestinian territories: the European Coordinating 
Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS) and EUBAM Rafah - 
the observation mission which oversees the implementation of the Israeli-
Palestinian agreement of the Rafah border which is a transition point 
between Gaza and Egypt. Despite the boycott of the Palestinian Authority 
that resulted in the suspension of EUPOL, the acceptance by the parties 
of a limited security role for the EU is a significant political penetration, 
showing the growing trust placed in the Europeans in this very sensitive 
area. These two missions should be seen in the context of the overall EU 
strategy for political engagement and practical assistance to the parties in 
the Middle East peace process. However, because of the partial success 
of the EU’s operational missions, the EU must address the weaknesses of 
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EUPOL COPPS. In particular, the mission must focus on capacity-building 
and reform rather than equipment and it should strengthen rather than 
weaken the rule of law. In this sense, cooperation with other operational 
actors is also very important.
The EUSRs are appointed to support the High Representative for the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy7 in specific regions of the world. In 
general, their role is to promote EU policies and interests, assist in efforts 
to consolidate peace, stability and the rule of law, and help coordinate 
EU policy8. Direct action by the EU in the Middle East Peace Process has 
been possible through the presence of the High Representative and 
the Union’s special envoy. The first High Representative for the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy was appointed in 1999. It was Javier Solana9 
and he had been the High representative for ten years and had actively 
participated in all bilateral and multilateral discussions about the Middle 
East. The role of the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security 
Policy has grown steadily since its creation. The High Representative has 
been particularly active in relation to the Middle East Peace Process and 
has made a significant contribution to advancing the EU’s objectives 
in the region. The presence of Javier Solana as well as of other special 
representatives of the European Union, more than any other Member 
State in particular, has contributed the most impact of European policy 
on the conflict. Their intervention to resolve the conflict was evident during 
the negotiations,10 in the security dialogue and humanitarian assistance 
during the one of the worst stage of the conflict in 200211 and in the active 
participation of the Quartet since its creation in 2002, leading to the Road 
Map. However, the mediation of Javier Solana in the peace process was 
7 In 2009. Catherine Ashton became the European Union’s High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy. Under the Treaty of Lisbon this post is combined with the post of Vice-President of the European 
Commission. First EU High Representative for foreign and security policy was Javier Solana (1999 - 2009) In fact, 
his intervention contributed the most impact to the EU mediation in the peace process. 
8 There are currently 11 EUSRs (Afghanistan, African Union, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Middle East, Central Asia, 
South Caucasus, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Sudan and the African Great Lakes) with mandates that vary 
according to the political context.
9 Javier Solana has become well known on the international scene for his personal and intensive involvement in 
managing international crises such as the Iranian nuclear dispute.
10 Particular in the  Mitchell commission’s efforts to obtain a cease-fire.
11 The Second Intifada is popularly referred to as the al-Aqsa Intifada after the Jerusalem mosque where the initial 
violence broke out. The intifada or “uprising” resulted from a combination of the failure of the Oslo process in 
creating conditions for an independent Palestinian state and failure of the preceding Camp David Summit. This 
intifada differed from the First Intifada in the use of violence by both sides, with Palestinian groups deploying suicide 
bombers and Israel invading Palestinian towns with tanks and helicopter gunships.
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the most concrete after the outbreak of the Second Intifada, particularly 
in the period from 2000 to 2002. Namely, the conflict in the Middle East 
since the summer of 2000 has been a difficult test for Europe’s doctrine of 
crisis prevention and management. Javier Solana and his special envoy 
Miguel Moratinos had a key role in overcoming the crisis, which meant 
the end of the peace process and seriously challenged the EU’s vision of 
resolution of the conflict.12
The EU’s political role in the Middle East Peace 
Process 
The Middle East Peace Process may well be the most spectacular 
deception in modern diplomatic history. So many people have been 
interested in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for so long that there are literally 
thousands of books and many more thousands of articles devoted to it. 
Most follow a simple pattern - a discussion of the origins of the conflict, an 
explanation for its intractability, and a set of prescriptions for how to bring 
it to a close (Peleg, 1998; Yorke, 1999; Ginat, Perkins, Corr, 2002; Aoun, 
2003; Asseburg, 2004; Tocci, 2011.).
To go into the analysis of the European Union’s mediation in the Middle 
East Peace Process, it is necessary to define the concept of the peace 
process.
When we talk about peace process, it can be referred to in general as 
“Peace Building and Conflict Resolution” and specifically as the “Peace 
Process in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict,” which is the subject of research 
in this paper.
In the mid-1970s the term “peace process” began to be widely used to 
describe the American-led efforts to bring about a negotiated peace 
between Israel and its neighbours. The phrase stuck, and ever since it has 
12 See concrete engagement after the second intifada in: Ortega, M. A new EU policy on the Mediterranean? , EU 
Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2003.
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been synonymous with the gradual, step-by-step approach to resolving 
one of the world’s most difficult conflicts (Quandt, 2001). Generally, the 
conflict between Israelis and Palestinians can be described as political 
tensions and open hostilities between the Arab peoples and the Jewish 
community of the Middle East that have lasted for over a century.
The analysis which follows (EU Mediation in the Middle East Peace Process) 
is based on the so-called interest-based, facilitative approach towards 
mediation. As such, mediation is defined as a voluntary and confidential 
method of a structured process, where one or more impartial third parties 
assist conflict parties to reach a mutually satisfactory solution. The mediator 
provides a framework, but makes no substantial suggestions or decisions 
in the case (Herrberg, 2008: 9). 
In the case of the Middle East Peace Process there are four impartial third 
parties in the scope of the so-called Middle East Quartet. What became 
known as the Quartet thus included four actors: the United States, the 
European Union, Russia and the United Nations. Its aim was to create a 
multilateral framework aimed at an Israeli-Palestinian negotiated solution 
based on UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 24213 (1967) and 338 
(1973) alongside the “land for peace” principle enshrined in the Oslo 
process.14 More concretely, the stated aim of the Quartet was to support 
the establishment of two states, Israel and Palestine, existing side by side 
within secure and recognized borders. Over the last decade the Quartet 
has affirmed itself as the official international forum for resolving the 
Middle East conflict, issuing regular statements and conducting a series of 
initiatives.15 However, the role between the four Quartet partners has not 
been equal, with the US and the EU adopting a more proactive role than 
the UN and Russia. Yossi Mekelberg commented that the EU and US played 
the leading roles in the Quartet, whereas the contributions of the United 
Nations and Russia were less significant. Dr Ahmad Khalidi saw the EU as 
inclined to follow the lead of the US (http://www.parliament.uk/hleu). 
13 Resolution 242 is one of the most commonly referred UN resolutions to end the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the basis 
of later negotiations between the parties. See http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1967/scres67.htm  http://
www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1973/scres73.htm for more information.
14 The term “Oslo Process” refers to the Israeli-Palestinian political process that started in 1993 and which was 
designed to reach a Permanent Status Agreement and end the conflict. See http://reut-institute.org/Publication.
aspx?PublicationId=542.
15 For example, in its first two initiatives related to Palestinian reform and the Road Map the EU was in the political lead 
within the Quartet, taking the cue from Washington’s unilateral moves outside the Quartet in support of a two-state 
solution premised on a reformed Palestinian Authority.
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However, the inclusion of the EU within the Quartet was an 
acknowledgement of the growing political role of the EU in the Middle 
East Peace Process and the legitimacy of the EU’s involvement as a major 
contributor to funding and institution building.
The Framework is the so-called Road Map for Peace that provided the 
diplomatic framework to achieve these goals. The Road Map foresaw 
three phases of implementation aimed at establishing a Palestinian state 
in three years:
1. the cessation of violence, Palestinian reform (including security sec-
tor reform), settlement freeze, Israeli withdrawal to the pre-Intifada 
(28 September 2000) lines “as the security situation improves” and 
Palestinian elections.
2. the creation of a Palestinian state with provisional borders.
3. the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations leading to a permanent status 
solution.
The principles of the Road Map included reciprocal steps undertaken by 
Israelis and Palestinians in the security, political, economic, humanitarian 
and institutional domains (Tocci, 2011:9).
Resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is of a strategic priority for Europe. The 
EU’s objective is a two-state solution with an independent, democratic, 
viable Palestinian state existing side-by-side with Israel and its other 
neighbours. Analyzing the EU’s role in the Middle East Peace Process, it 
can be concluded that EU policy in the Middle East has focused on three 
main areas:
 - Provision of financial and economic aid to quicken the completion 
of the peace process;
 - Strengthening regional cooperation in the Middle East and 
encouraging multilateral political negotiations to end the conflict;
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The basic stance of the European Union on the peace process in the 
Middle East was first introduced by the European Council’s 1980 Venice 
Declaration and repeatedly confirmed during the summit and the 
meetings of the Council on Foreign Relations of the EU. Some of the 
declarations of the European Union have proved essential in the peace 
process. Their chronology can be distinguished as follows:
 ● The Venice Declaration of 1980 - Joint European Policy towards 
the Arab-Israeli conflict was formulated in the Venice Declaration 
of June 1980 which recognised the right to security and existence 
for all states in the region, including Israel, and the need to fulfil 
the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. At the time, thirteen 
years before Israel recognized the PLO as its negotiating partner in 
the Declaration of Principles of 199316, EC’s defence of the principle 
of self-determination implicitly recognised the Palestinians’ right 
to aspire to a state alongside Israel. That was the basis for the 
EU’s support for a negotiated two-state solution. In this sense, 
the European Community was well in advance of the prevailing 
international consensus on the principles to be adopted towards 
resolving the conflict. Previously mentioned, the Declaration of 
Principles, in which Israel and the PLO formally recognised each 
other as legitimate negotiating partners, brought the EU more 
directly into contact with the parties. The EU encouraged both 
Israelis and Palestinians to negotiate and implement interim and 
staged objectives as a means of building confidence between the 
parties moving towards the negotiation of final-status issues.
 ● The Berlin Declaration of 1999 –During the German presidency 
between January and May 1999 the EU played a visible role with 
respect to Palestinian threats to issue a unilateral declaration of 
independence (UDI). The EU’s Berlin Declaration in March 1999, 
which included a commitment to support the creation of a 
Palestinian state in the context of permanent status talks with Israel, 
was part of a package of measures designed to compensate the 
PA and Yasser Arafat in return for delaying an UDI. At that time the EU 
16 The Oslo I Accord or Oslo I, officially called the “Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements 
or Declaration of Principles (DOP),” was an attempt in 1993 to resolve the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It was 
the first face-to-face agreement between the government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). 
These agreements were finalised in Oslo, and were officially signed in Washington D.C. on September 13 1993. 
Mahmoud Abbas signed for the PLO and Shimon Pres signed for the State of Israel.
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had provided substantial funds to the Palestinians and appointed a 
special coordinator to assist the PA in the area of security. As a result, 
following the election of Ehud Barak as Israeli prime minister, many 
European officials and analysts have indicated an expectation of 
rapid progress in the peace process, assisted or accompanied by 
greater EU involvement (Steinberg, 1999.). 
 ● The Seville Declaration of June 2002 – At the European Council in 
Seville in 2002 the presidency of the European Council adopted 
the Declaration on the Middle East. Among other things, the 
Declaration emphasizes the importance of a political solution 
through negotiations and introduces specific details of the final 
status. 
 ● The Road Map - In June 2002 the EU co-sponsored the Road-
Map approach as a framework for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations 
towards the goal of a two-state solution.
 ● The Road Map emphasizes the need for Palestinian institution-
building and economic recovery with a view to enhancing the 
strength and viability of the future Palestinian state. This “state-
building process” requires sustained engagement on the part of the 
international community. It also requires urgent improvement on 
issues related to freedom of movement in the occupied Palestinian 
territory. The EU has repeatedly called for the immediate freezing 
of settlement activities and the proactive dismantling of outposts 
as set out in the Road Map. With the acceptance by the US of the 
Road Map, this position represented the international consensus.17 
At the same time, the Quartet was formed by the US, the EU, the UN 
and Russia which began to shape international policy towards the 
Middle East Peace Process. Since 2003 the official position of the 
EU has been to facilitate the staged implementation of the Road 
Map.
 ● Annapolis Process - From 2007 onwards the EU actively supported 
the “Annapolis Process” which committed the Israelis and the 
Palestinians to implement Road Map obligations and to reach 
a peace agreement by the end of 2008. In November 2007 
an EU Action Strategy for the Middle East Peace Process was 
17  The UN Security Council endorsed the Road Map in it’s Resolution 1515 of 19 November 2003.
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tabled by the European Commissioner for External Relations and 
Neighbourhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, and the EU High 
Representative for the Common and Foreign Security Policy, Javier 
Solana, setting out a range of ways in which the EU can support 
the peace process and the conditions which are necessary for 
support to be effective. Considering the numerous risks involved 
(lack of time, weak leadership in both Israel and the West Bank, the 
split of the Palestinian territories, ongoing rocket fire from Hamas 
and Israeli settlements, a lack of determination in the Arab world 
to enact its Beirut Declaration (Arab Peace Initiative) to enable 
a sustainable peace, and a deterioration of the living conditions 
in the Palestinian territories) agreement could not be reached by 
the agreed deadline. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the 
European Union and its member states played a crucial role in 
reviving the Quartet’s Road Map in early 2007 and in the run-up to 
the Annapolis meeting.
 ● In December 2008 EU Heads of State and Government made a 
statement18 stressing that a comprehensive peace in the Middle 
East remains a top priority for 2009. In this statement the EU is more 
determined than ever to assist alongside the other members of the 
Quartet and the region’s states in ending violence and relaunching 
the peace process. Therefore, EU proposals to resolve the crisis are: 
immediate and permanent ceasefire, immediate humanitarian 
action and stepping up the peace process.19
Based on the above, it is clear that the EU’s consistent support since 1980 
for a negotiated two-state solution as the basis for final settlement of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict has subsequently gained the adherence of the 
majority of the international community and, above all, since 2002, of the 
US, UN and Russia.
18 It’s about the individual EU statement. On the other hand, since its inception the Quartet regularly adopts statements 
[of?] the Middle East Peace Process. The latest statement dates from April 2012. Review of all statements available 
at: http://www.un.org/apps/news/docs.asp?Topic=Middle%20East&Type=Quartet%20statement 
19 See: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/cfsp/105082.pdf. Since 2000 
the EU regularly adopts declarations on the situation in the Middle East, including the Arab-Israeli conflict. The last 
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Currently the EU participates in the peace process through:
 - the Quartet; including the political and financial support and 
assistance in human resources and appointing a special envoy 
for the exemption.20 The Quartet as a mechanism reflects several 
fundamental principles of EU foreign and security policy, such as 
a belief in multilateralism. The inclusion of the EU within the Quartet 
was an evidence of the growing political role of the EU in the Middle 
East Peace Process and the legitimacy of the EU’s involvement as a 
major contributor to funding and institution building.
 - bilateral relations with Israel and the Palestinian Authority - which 
is supported through the Association Agreements, or the Interim 
Agreement and the Action Plan which was adopted in 2005 within 
the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy,
 - regional dialogue through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
(Union for the Mediterranean), which remains the only multilateral 
forum outside the United Nations where all parties can meet.
 - a variety of confidence building measures; for example electoral 
observation activities.21
 - assistance aimed at creating conditions for peace, stability and 
prosperity in the region: encouraging economic, social, political 
and security reforms, providing humanitarian assistance to refugees, 
bringing together neighbouring countries within the EU Partnership 
for Peace program.22 The EU has contributed substantial funding to 
the PA with the aim of sustaining it and building a viable Palestinian 
state with functioning institutions, which is necessary if the two state 
solution is to become a reality. 
There is a general conclusion that the European Union plays an important 
role in the Quartet. This is apparent in the recent revitalization of the 
Quartet, which has now issued a number of statements about the peace 
process since 2007 and in the EU’s role in leading the international debate 
and in influencing the US position. The EU has encouraged the idea of 
20 Andreas Reinicke was appointed on 1st February 2012. His mandate runs until 30 June 2013. The mandate of the 
Special Representative is based on the EU’s policy objectives regarding the Middle East peace process.
21 EU election monitors oversaw the 2005 and 2006 elections-
22 EU annually allocates 100 million euros to help Palestinian refugees through the UN agencies.
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meetings between the Quartet and regional parties and that is now 
effectively Quartet policy. On the other hand, introducing the Temporary 
International Mechanism (TIM)23 in 2006, as a vehicle for maintaining 
humanitarian support to the Palestinians, also strengthened the EU position 
in the Quartet. 
The EU’s membership in the Quartet has enabled it to extend its access and 
influence to policy-makers in the region, particularly as the EU is now also 
perceived as having a more unified voice than in the past. Membership in 
the Quartet has also enhanced the EU’s access to US policy-makers and 
it is seen as a useful bridge between the Arab world and the US. At the 
time of highest violence in spring 2002, US intervention was very limited, 
since the idea that the fight against terrorism had to be pursued following 
September 11. The EU redoubled its efforts during this period and always 
tried to maintain open dialogue and reduce the effects of the violence. 
Since September 2002, the US and the EU have found that the Quartet is 
an adequate framework for cooperation. 
Based on the above, it can be said that the EU’s role within the Quartet 
needs to be more active and assertive than it has been in the past, 
providing leadership, with imaginative ideas and through engaging in a 
intensive dialogue with other partners, in particular the US.
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was launched in 199524, in part as an 
adjunct and support mechanism for the Oslo Peace Process then taking 
place between Israel and the Palestinians. The Euro-Mediterranean’s 
political focus stopped short of entering into the details of the continuing 
conflict, but sought to support peace-building efforts by seeking to build 
regional integration, including through the promotion of a Mediterranean 
Free Trade Zone. Unfortunately, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership 
23 This mechanism was developed by the EU at the request of the Quartet (the EU, USA, UN and Russia) and 
endorsed by the European Council in order to facilitate the direct delivery of assistance to the Palestinian people, 
thus avoiding any financial links with the PA government. The objective of the mechanism is to relieve the current 
socio-economic crisis in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, to ensure continued delivery of essential social public 
services to the Palestinian people and to facilitate the maximum level of support by international donors and the 
resumption of Palestinian revenue transfers by Israel. It is limited in scope and duration, and operates with full 
accountability and transparency.http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/countrycooperation/
occupied_palestinian_territory/tim/index_en.htm
24 Formerly known as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process).Cooperation agreements were re-
launched in 2008 as the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). The re-launch was an opportunity to render relations 
both more concrete and more visible with the initiation of new regional and sub-regional projects with real relevance 
for those living in the region. 
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also failed because the EU lacked more of an assertive political role in 
the peace process. The regional aspirations of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership also suffered from the stalling of the Oslo Peace Process and 
the subsequent suspension of direct peace negotiations.25 Yet, the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (Union for the Mediterranean) remains the 
only regional forum in which Israelis and Arabs have continued to meet, 
even at the height of bilateral tensions.
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has emerged as a different 
type of instrument, based on deepening the EU’s bilateral relations 
with neighbouring states, including Israel and the Palestinian Authority, 
and partly as a means of using the bilateral approach to overcome 
the blockages inherent in region-wide policies exemplified by the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership. The ENP Action Plans which are bilaterally 
negotiated by the EU with each partner also carry the advantage of 
bringing the political and economic instruments of the EU closer together 
under the Commission, which is thus able to create approaches better 
tailored to the individual circumstances of each partner. On 12 May 2010 
the Commission published the so-called “neighbourhood package,” 
consisting of an overall assessment of five years of implementation 
of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and 12 country reports 
on developments in 2009, including one on Israel and the occupied 
Palestinian territory. Israel remained an active partner in the framework 
of the ENP. This was demonstrated by progress made in implementing 
a large number of priorities of the Action Plan. The deterioration in the 
overall political context, in particular as regards the Gaza conflict in 
December 2008-January 2009 and a lack of progress in 2009 on the Middle 
East Peace Process, affected the process of upgrading bilateral relations 
between the EU and Israel. On the other hand, the EU and the Palestinian 
Authority (PA) have made a huge step towards enhancing political 
dialogue and reform within the framework of the ENP, most notably in 
the fields of the rule of law and public financial management. However, 
the ability of the PA to implement reforms continued to be limited as a 
result of the ongoing Israeli occupation, the blockade of Gaza and by 
the persistent political, legal and economic split between the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip. However, the ENP has greater potential than the 
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Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to satisfy the desire of both Israel and 
the Palestinians to normalize their relations with the outside world. Finally, 
it can be concluded that while the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has 
been useful in the past, it is now the European Neighbourhood Policy that 
can make a contribution to developing relations with the parties to the 
Middle East Peace Process.
Conclusion
Since the beginning of development of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) at Maastricht, which entered into force in 1993, and 
strengthening of that policy in the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and Treaty 
of Lisbon in 2009, including the nomination of a High Representative in 
the person of Javier Solana, the EU has supported or participated in all 
international efforts to resolve the important issues between Israelis and 
Palestinians.
However, the early stages of the peace negotiations have been 
characterised by the EU’s lack of political resources and instruments, 
the absence of a collective political will and accordingly an insufficient 
degree of coordination among the EU member states. In addition, the 
EU has not been perceived as being an influential actor by any of the 
parties involved. However, in parallel with the internal institutionalisation, 
in particular the introduction of foreign policy instruments, EU actorness 
has slowly taken shape over the decades and finally resulted in the formal 
recognition as an equal negotiation partner with the inclusion in the 
Middle East Quartet in 2002.
Europe has showed greater willingness in recent years to play a larger part 
in the Middle East’s most protracted conflict, that of Israel and Palestine. 
But willingness doesn’t necessarily indicate readiness. Has the EU affirmed 
itself as an effective multilateral forum and has the EU contributed to the 
mediation of security in the Middle East? It can be concluded that the 
European Union has invested great efforts to resolve the conflict in the 
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Middle East. But, the Middle East conflict is perhaps the best example 
of disparity between the found costs and results achieved in the peace 
process. 
Since the agreement under the latest initiative (Annapolis process) has not 
been reached within the agreed time, the Quartet also has not affirmed 
itself as an effective mediation forum. The Quartet is not without value. 
To play a useful role, it should be enlarged and reshaped as a forum to 
establish a renewed international consensus on the Arab-Israeli conflict.
With the traditional goal of the existence of two democratic, peaceful 
states, existing side by side within secure and recognized borders, 
the EU should be more decisive in opposing the division of Palestine, 
Israel’s collective punishment of the Gaza population, but it should also 
globally condemn terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians. On the other 
hand, despite the emotional desire to return to great power status and 
compete with the U.S., it is important that the EU avoids succumbing to 
this temptation in the Middle East. Competition between Washington 
and Brussels leads to a situation in which Europe is used to “balance” and 
block the American role.
Based on the analysis above we can therefore conclude that although the 
EU peace initiatives have not made substantial progress towards  its efforts 
to find concrete solutions for resolving conflicts and achieving sustainable 
peace, the EU still plays a major role in the future development of the 
turbulent region of the Middle East. 
Only an objective and impartial mediation in which the EU has an 
important role and the determined use of the instruments at its disposal 
may be the key to the success of the peace process in the future
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Understanding Media Policies: A European 
Perspective.1 Evangelia Psychogiopoulou (ed.)
Thirty four authors have contributed, either jointly or individually, the texts to 
this volume on media policies in 14 countries which was researched within 
the FP7 project MEDIADEM.2 The aim has been to explore the configuration 
of state media policies that target or constrain the development of free 
and independent media in 12 EU member states (Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Romania, Slovakia, 
Spain and the UK) and two candidate countries (Croatia and Turkey). 
Evangelia Psychogiopoulou from the Hellenic Foundation for European 
and Foreign Policy ELIAMEP coordinated the research and edited the 
book. 
The introduction written by her and Dia Anagnostou (Recasting the 
Contours of Media Policy in a Political Context: An Introduction) points 
out that the book examines national media policies and seeks to redefine 
their nature and scope through the study of both traditional and new 
media. The country case studies that follow represent an attempt to 
offer responses to questions such as: “What are the regulatory practices, 
policy tools and institutional features of media policies in the countries 
studied?” “What have been the policy principles and values that have 
shaped these polices?” “How are these policies reconfigured now under 
the ongoing pressures for deregulation and impacts of technological 
evolution, European integration and global economy?” (2)
The present analysis of 14 media policies shows that the contemporary 
media systems only partly reflect basic characteristics of the democratic 
corporatist, polarised pluralist and liberal media models developed 
in the Hallin and Mancini media systems typology (Comparing Media 
Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics, 2004). The diversification 
of media systems and models has increased due to new technologies, 
1 Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan 2012. 284pp ISBN 978-0-230-34812-7
2 European Media Policies Revisited: Valuing and Reclaiming Free and Independent Media in Contemporary 
Democratic Systems. The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union Seventh 
Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement FP7-SSH-2009-244365 (Mediadem)
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market liberalisation and the issuing of changes in media production 
and consumption, as well as due to political developments and systemic 
restructuring of some European countries. In this respect media policy 
making has become “an increasingly complex and multi-layered 
process”, while the regulatory rules are being modified under the “blurring 
of boundaries between distinct policy sectors” (11). The diverse country 
experiences testify to the fact that the same rules may be observed 
in different ways and that media policies are primarily constituted at 
the national levels, while the European regulatory efforts contribute 
to interlinking and eventually standardising some of these levels. The 
national variations of the researched media systems are visible in policy 
approaches, institutional practices, regulatory instruments and media 
practices, as well as in distinct institutional settings. Being ever more 
influenced by European integration processes and global technology 
standards they are relatively comparable. Each country chapter follows 
a similar structure which allows for the re-alignment of research results and 
pointing out of differences and similarities between researched media 
systems and policies.
The Belgian case reflects an institutional complexity which results from 
differences in language, culture and economy between the Flemish and 
French communities and their reflection on media policy and regulation. 
On the other hand, the integrality of Danish media policy seems to be built 
on “a comprehensive media policy system, designed to promote media 
pluralism and diversity” (17). While Belgian and Danish media policies 
strongly focus on issues such as pluralism, diversity and the respective 
roles of state and society, the Finnish case demonstrates the centrality 
of freedom of expression and media freedom in mediatisation processes 
and media policy conceptualisation.
Bulgarian, Croatian, Estonian, Romanian and Slovakian cases display a 
range of different media practices in post-communist countries. Media 
restructuring and development in these countries is under strong global 
and European influences particularly as regards technological change, 
liberalisation and privatisation of media and different interpretations of 
their roles in democratisation processes. While in Bulgaria the new role 
of media appears to be comparable to the role of political parties, 
thus reflecting strong political and state influences on media, in Croatia 
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the media seem to avoid such a brutal political usage and are more 
submitted to market and economic influences of transnational media 
corporations seeking to standardise and interlink media markets in the 
Southeast European region. The inconsistent patterns of the post-socialist 
transitions are reflected in particular national media practices and may 
be illustrated by the Estonian case where, due to the small market, media 
policy needs to be “more interventionist or active, representing the public 
need for balanced and trustful information” (97). The Estonian media policy 
lacks analysis and balancing of value dilemmas (98), which may also be 
a problem in all transitional states. Analysis of the Romanian media policy 
demonstrates how the media previously taken over by the state have 
now been taken over by private interests which undermine government 
intervention and block market liberalisation. The media regulations are 
therefore formal and inefficient. The dominant cultural model, followed 
by both journalists and local politicians, constrains internal democratic 
changes. The result is poor media quality (which is often state subsidised) 
and low public participation in public communication processes (181). 
Media policy making in Slovakia has not paid proper attention to the 
restructuration of public services which seem to lack “a more competent 
management” (195). The private media have been established in a rather 
chaotic market framework functioning in collision with “historic memories” 
and business pressures.
Media policy making in the post-communist countries shows that they 
may have similar experiences, problems and even aspirations, but that 
their local responses are very different. Moreover, the transitional media 
systems, media models and media policies have not been stabilised and 
consistent enough to be clearly labelled and eventually compared to 
Hallin and Mancini’s media models. 
In the converged media environment of Germany a variety of media 
operators in 14 German states experience difficulties in balancing 
different interests and regulations. Media policy has become “… subject 
to an on-going process of re-configuration” (130). The “… coexistence of 
public service and private broadcasting has been at the root of many 
disputes between the operators and the respective media makers” 
(129), which increases the role of courts in media policy making. “What 
might be a viable model of market co-existence for public service and 
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private broadcasting online offers?” is a nationally relevant question that 
surpasses the German borders to become a key European media issue.
Greece, Italy and Spain reflect the situation in which the EU law and human 
rights norms have substantially shaped domestic regulatory decisions, but 
have not succeeded in countering the atypical relationship “… between 
the state and private media interests” (147). The challenges of media 
deregulation, market liberalisation, new technologies and new media are 
often answered by ad hoc and short-term government interventions. In the 
Italian case a fine-tuning of media policy as a response to technological 
developments is stressed. In Spain post-dictatorship transitions have not 
(yet) produced “a clear media policy” (18). The present analyses confirm 
that a number of media policy issues remain unresolved in these countries 
that best fit Hallin and Mancini’s polarised pluralist model.
The UK media seem to be under pressure for further deregulation in the 
commercial broadcasting sector, which weakens the position of BBC and 
reduces the reporting responsibilities of the independent regulator Ofcom 
(244). At the same time the media system experiences re-regulatory 
pressures that are “likely to lead to a strengthening of a regulatory regime 
for the press and review of the existing media ownership rules” (244). The UK 
media environment is indirectly influenced by political and governmental 
power. However, the fact that the media market is extremely diversified 
enables the incorporation of different regulatory approaches. Innovative 
models are being identified in the media market while the watchdog role 
of media is supported by freedom of information legislation.
In the case of Turkey, an implicit rather than explicit media policy seems 
to be constituted by the Turkish state. The mainstream media hardly 
challenge any of the state interests, but the society ever more demands 
the access to true and impartial information, which is endorsed by an 
increasing usage of the internet and the emergence of social media.
The conclusion by Katharine Sarikakis discusses the roles of markets and 
European politics in the governance of media transformations. The author 
concludes that media policies have so far failed to deal with a number of 
“significant issues” (such as: democratisation of media structures, media 
concentration and increased privatisation, digitalisation across Europe, 
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etc.) which would contribute to “a sustained participation of citizens in 
media policy” (255). 
Further development of media policies and their coordination at the 
European level are certainly needed. However, as the present analyses 
demonstrate, media policy making is a multilayered and ever more 
complex process. It reflects state and society capabilities and efforts to 
create new communication environments. In this respect Understanding 
Media Policies offers a wealth of information on such efforts which also 
show how difficult and challenging it is to constitute media systems, 
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The European Security and Defense Policy: 
Policy formulation in triangular relations 
between Germany, France and the United 
Kingdom,1 Andreas Marchetti
The author is a senior fellow at the Centre for European Integration Studies 
(CEI) at the University of Bonn. The book, representing his doctoral thesis, 
provides within eight chapters a highly detailed and systematic analysis 
of the genesis and potential development of the European Security and 
Defense Policy (hereinafter: ESDP2) in the context of interdependent 
relations between Germany, France and United Kingdom. These three 
European states figure as key political actors in this process, contributing 
significantly to its dynamics through their joint initiatives. The main purpose 
of the book, whose scope is limited to the period from 1998 till 2007, was 
to explore and identify the specificities of three selected national policies 
through a prism of motives, modalities and, consequently, impacts which 
they have on the ESDP.
In the first chapter the author introduces the subject by providing a systematic 
overview of intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism and federalism as 
the key theories applicable in the research of European integration and 
addresses the current stage of research in the field. He argues that both 
intergovernmentalism and neofuncionalism, enriched by elements of 
institutionalism and by constructivist approaches, could partly explain the 
very nature of the ESDP. Furthermore, he provides definitions of key notions – 
the Common Foreign and Defense Policy (CFDP) and the European Security 
and Defense Policy (ESDP) and concludes the chapter by explaining the 
process of scientific research and methodology used in the book. 
The second chapter represents a broad overview of the (pre)history of the 
ESDP after World War II (to name but a few themes: creation of the European 
defense community, the Fouchet Plan, European political cooperation 
1 Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009. 378 pp. ISBN 978-3-8329-4530-5 (The reviewer’s translation from the original: Die 
Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik: Politikformulierung in Beziehungsdreieck Deutschland-Frankreich-
Grossbritannie)
2  With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in January 2009, the title „European Security and Defence Policy“ 
(ESDP) had been changed into: „Common Security and Defence Policy“(CSDP). 
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and the European single act) and various other stages which paved the 
way for its creation in the post-Cold war period. The author elaborates 
on the European Union Treaty and the Maastricht (1992) and Amsterdam 
(1998) treaties, and he consequently observes that it was only through the 
British-French agreement during the summit in Saint-Malo in late 1998 that 
the Europan defense policy was properly included into the framework of 
the European Union. Germany and France appeared as the unwinding 
promoters of European security and defense integration; however, there 
are some basic discrepancies to observe: while France favored the 
emancipation of Europe from the United States in the field of security and 
defense policy, Germany has been committed to strengthening both 
its European and transatlantic dimension. This implied at least a “silent 
alliance” between Germany and the UK, which was consistently in contrast 
to European competitiveness in relation to transatlantic assurances, and 
initially hampered the inclusion of a defense policy into the framework of 
the European Union. At the same time the United Kingdom and France 
have been jointly opposing any communitarisation of European security 
and defense policy whatsoever. Hence, the “natural” foreign policy 
coalition of three selected states could not have been developed.
In the third chapter the author explores the motives which shaped the 
actions of Germany, France and the United Kingdom towards the ESDP. 
By distinguishing the internal factors (domestic policies) from the external 
ones (foreign policies, security risks, strategic ties within the European Union) 
and from the positions of institutional stakeholders on the European level 
(the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Secretary 
General of the European Council), the author explores to what extent 
all these parameters influenced the actions of the selected countries. 
In respect of Germany, he identifies the gap between its declared 
commitment to further boost developments within the security and 
defense policies and its own ability to justify such policies at the national 
level. He furthermore points out that France continues to act in favor 
of empowering European defense without strengthening its institutions, 
whereas the UK supports the ESDP primarily as a necessary component of 
transatlantic security architecture.
Within the forth chapter, dealing with the modalities for creation and further 
development of the ESDP, Marchetti firstly reviews developments from the 
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summit in Cologne (1999), Helsinki and Nizza (2000) and consequently 
touches upon developments which led to adoption of the European 
security strategy in 2003, the Draft Constitutional Treaty and Lisbon Treaty 
in 2009. Arguing that the position of Germany in relation to France and 
the United Kingdom is not only variable, but also weaker, as Germany 
fully participates only in the civilian part of the ESDP, the author does not 
observe the role of three states as a functioning leadership triangle, but 
rather as a loose constellation of three with a Franco-British base and a 
supplementary contribution by Germany. 
The fifth chapter deals with the effects for the ESDP. As the author 
distinguishes the immediate from indirect effects and impacts on the 
European Union’s operational capacity and consequently explores 
developments of a European strategic culture in the field, he attempts 
to draw conclusion as to how the national roles match the proclaimed 
motivations. He argues that the national policies within the ESDP have 
been strongly influenced by the underlying motives of states. Germany 
participates in European defense selectively, avoiding the most dangerous 
operations. France has been especially engaged in military operations 
that have been conducted without the involvement of NATO, whereas 
the UK hesitates to play a leading role in military operations carried out 
without NATO’s resources and capabilities.
The results of the author’s research are presented within the sixth 
chapter of the book, which contains a substantial analysis that points 
out that Germany perceives the ESDP as a tool for further deepening 
of European integration and for the consolidation of German defense 
policy through multilateralism. On the other hand, France strives to 
achieve ever-increasing capabilities within the ESDP due to its own 
political ambitions, whereas the UK contributes to the ESDP mainly with 
a view of strengthening the transatlantic security architecture. “The 
conflict of objectives” between these three states, which is unlikely to be 
solved, has implications on their mutual relations and their co-operation 
within the ESDP. To that end, regardless of its active contribution to 
developments of the ESDP, Germany considers itself rather deferred from 
its emerging military dimension as it does not correspond to German 
strategic culture. French security ambitions to create a more capable 
and independent Europe are confronted with the unwillingness of France 
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to limit its own autonomy in the field. Likewise, the author points out that 
the United Kingdom supports strengthening the ESDP even though it 
possesses – according to British perception – a potential to endanger the 
transatlantic security architecture. Consequently, Marchetti establishes 
the comparative scheme in respect of Germany, France and the United 
Kingdom, that indicates their match of interests, their willingness to 
compromise, the resources they have available for action and their ability 
to take control of leadership in European security and defense policy. 
Within the triangle Germany has been identified as the most flexible actor 
in the ESDP, however – in terms of active management - it is considered 
as an indispensible “junior partner” of France and the UK.
The last two chapters provide an overview of the policy and military 
missions and operations of the European Union from 2003 to 2007, following 
the exhaustive list of reference sources. 
In sum, the book represents a valuable contribution to European security 
discourse for several reasons. Regardless of Marchetti’s hermetic writing 
style, which is distinctively recognizable in extensive scientific papers, 
the research which was carried out provides the reader with a thorough 
insight into the basic features of the development of the ESDP. As a 
reliable source of information the book can be instrumental in obtaining 
a comprehensive insight into the very nature of this emerging European 
policy. 
Moreover, the author’s holistic approach applied in the book takes into 
consideration the relevant theories and schools of European Union studies 
and international relations, which proved applicable on the ESDP given its 
specific intergovernmental nature. It is, therefore, primarily recommended 
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Prijepori u teorijama međunarodnih odnosa  
(Controversies in Theories of International 
Relations),1 Petar Popović
As the title suggests, Popović’s first book is an analysis of three major 
traditions in the theories of international relations: realism, liberalism and 
rationalism. Furthermore, the book is a short intellectual history of the 
West, with a strong emphasis on the English-speaking world. Roughly two 
hundred pages are divided into seven chapters, with six of them being 
largely theoretical, while the seventh and final chapter represents a 
concrete application of discussed theories on the “sub-global society” of 
Southeastern Europe.
The first chapter “On the theory of international relations” serves to define 
the dominant theories of IR, including the radical or Marxist theory which 
is only rarely mentioned later in the book. It also defines the main subject 
of research, namely the relationship between states. In this chapter the 
author offers an original model of the phases of “international order” 
throughout history: from the archaic community, through the Greek 
polis, the Pax Romana, the Pax ecclesiae, the Westphalian system, to the 
Globalization of today. It also introduces us to the basics of the famous 
debate between the proponents of realism and liberalism.
Chapter Two, “Concepts of international order”, deepens the analysis 
of the realist and liberal theoretical traditions while concentrating on the 
Hobbesian concept of international anarchy and the Kantian concept 
of universal moral order. It also adds a third concept, international 
society, which is based on the work of 17th century Dutch scholar Hugo 
Grotius. Since it is hard to conceive the three traditions without a deeper 
understanding of the terms particularism and universalism, the author 
embarks on a rather perplexing digression towards a philosophical “theory 
of everything” (TOE), covering a timespan from Heraclitus of Ephesus to 
Bertrand Russell. 
1  Zagreb: Politička kultura, 2012. 215 pp. ISBN 978-953-258-063-1
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In Chapter Three - “Towards a contemporary liberal theory of international 
relations” - Popović discusses the appearance of liberal ideas in the Age of 
Enlightenment. Special attention is given to the Kantian tradition of friendship 
(as opposed to hostility and rivalry) between states, which is based on two 
fundamental rules of international order: 1. Dissent will be solved without 
violence or the threat of violence, and 2. Friendly states will fight together 
if one of them is in peril. The rules of nonviolence and mutual help are 
founded on the republican constitution, international law and commercial 
interdependence. It is underlined that the first liberal tendencies were 
advocated by individual intellectuals and not by states and their leaders. 
Chapter Four, “First attempts of establishing a liberal order in the year 
1919,” deals with the League of Nations as a mechanism of collective 
security. The author asserts that although the League had originally 
been envisaged as a guaranty for the liberal order based on Kantian 
ideals of peace and cooperation, in political reality it was much closer 
to the rivalry of John Locke. This meant that World War I was not “the 
war to end all wars” and that the League of Nations deteriorated into a 
concert of powers as it had been established by the earlier Congress of 
Vienna. The League turned out to be a complete failure, resulting in an 
autocratic wave across Europe and a new world war, which was even 
more devastating than the first.  
In the fifth chapter “Realist attempt to monopolize the science of 
international relations” Popović writes about the dominance of the realist 
tradition in the context of the Cold War. Realism in the second half of the 
20th century can be understood as a pessimistic and cynical reaction to 
liberal idealism and its hope that wars were a thing of the past. Instead, 
it focused on a pessimistic interpretation of human nature, defined by 
violence and the quest for power, as well as on a purely mechanistic 
balance of power, or rather “balance of fear,” having in mind the threat 
of a nuclear “mutual assured destruction” (MAD). Besides a complete 
abandonment of normativism in favor of a pure empiricism, the realists 
attempted to establish their theory as the sole theoretical framework for 
the explanation of the behavior of states in the international arena. 
Chapter Six, “Towards a synthesis of the liberal-realist debate,” is dedicated 
to the English school of IR which puts a new emphasis on Grotian rationalism. 
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This tradition points out that there exists an international society despite 
the condition of anarchy between states and that international politics 
are shaped not only by material interests but also by ideas. Hence, the 
absence of a central authority on a worldwide level needs to be remedied 
by a legal order founded on the rights and duties of all states making part 
of that society. It seems that the English School would be better interpreted 
as a “golden mean” or “middle way” between the extremes of realism 
and liberalism, keeping in mind that the term “synthesis” - in a strict sense 
- presupposes a completely new concept and not a reconciliation of two 
paradigms. The author indicates that controversies within theories of IR are 
by no means settled, mentioning the latest dichotomy within the English 
School between pluralists - who are less inclined to support humanitarian 
interventions such as the one in Kosovo - and solidarists - who argue that 
the international society has to do much more in protecting human rights, 
even if it means infringing on the sovereignty of states.  
The seventh and final chapter, “The sub-global society of Southeastern 
Europe,” applies the theories discussed so far on the so-called “Western 
Balkans,” an artificial region conceived by Brussels and encompassing the 
former Yugoslavia minus Slovenia and plus Albania. Emulating Barry Buzan, 
one of the leading theorists of the English School, Popović defines this part 
of Europe as a specific sub-global society which is striving to become 
part of a larger, more peaceful and more prosperous sub-global society, 
namely the European Union. However, there is a significant problem 
concerning the integration of ex-Yugoslavia into the EU. While the EU is a 
sub-global society organized according to Kantian ideals, the republics of 
former Yugoslavia only recently started moving from a Hobbesian homo 
homini lupus est world of mutual distrust and recurring violence towards a 
sub-global society organized along the Grotian principle of cooperation 
based on common rules and institutions. This is particularly visible in the 
continuous strengthening of cooperation between ex-Yugoslav states on 
issues such as corruption and organized crime, as well as in the handling 
of war crimes from the 1990s. The author expresses concern over the 
discrepancy between the EU and the “Western Balkans” and expresses 
his hope that the post-Yugoslav space will move more resolutely towards 
the liberal model. Although Popović doesn’t use the term “yugosphere” 
(coined by another proponent of the English School, Tim Judah) it is 
clear that this is what he has in mind. However, this is a purely theoretical 
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consideration and should not be misunderstood as an advocacy of the 
notorious predilection that Croatia should postpone its EU accession until 
all ex-Yugoslav republics are ready to take that step. 
All in all, Popović’s first book is an ambitious project, undertaken for the first 
time in Croatian political science, to move the IR theory beyond the level 
of description (what, when, where, and how) and to include the level 
of explanation (why). It is not only a masterful analysis of the three major 
traditions in the IR theory but also a fine application of the theoretical 
framework on the specific example of Southeastern Europe. The downside 
of the book is the fact that the reader needs a considerable amount of 
previous knowledge in order to grasp the philosophical intricacies, as well 
as the reoccurring feeling that one is caught in a theoretical tsunami (e.g. 
the author uses a myriad of names for terms such as “liberalism,” making 
it hard to follow the narrative). The impression that the book was written 
in one breath doesn’t necessarily have to appear to every reader, and 
if it does, it should be attributed to the ardor of a young researcher and 
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Towards Open Regionalism in South East 
Europe1 Paul Stubbs and Christophe Solioz (eds.) 
This book is written by a group of scientists and experts that analyze 
the possibilities for and problems in new emergent forms of regional 
cooperation in South East Europe. They view South East Europe through 
the lens of “new regionalism,” covering diverse themes from economic 
relations to organized crime, border practices, cultural production and 
civil society.
Christophe Solioz and Paul Stubbs situate South East Europe in the context 
of open regionalism that is described through variable geometries of 
multi-scalar networks and flows which produce and reproduce social 
constructions of place. Questioning geographical notions of space, the 
authors address the tensions of nation-state-region-building practices in 
the context of multiple histories of antagonism and co-operation. They 
address theoretical and conceptual approaches to new regionalism and 
region-making, the implications of moving from nation-building to region-
building in South East Europe and the complexities of so-called “regional 
ownership” as a response to the imposed agendas of those outside.
In the chapter on (post)Yugoslav anti-war activism Bojan Bilić shows us that 
(post)Yugoslav anti-war initiatives did not appear immediately prior to the 
armed conflicts in a state of social and political vacuum, rather that these 
undertakings, whose proponents invariably appreciated the cultural and 
linguistic affinities that characterize the Yugoslav space, appropriated the 
already existing activist networks developed throughout the second half 
of the 20th century. 
Dimitar Bechev focuses on the dynamics of and obstacles to regional co-
operation in South East Europe in an analysis of three crucially important 
sectors that have been the centre of the regional cooperation agenda 
since the mid-1990s: trade, energy and justice. Progress made in key 
functional sectors portrays cooperation in South East Europe as a by-
1 Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012. 225 pp ISBN 978-3-8329-6597-6
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product of the region’s integration into the EU. It is not coincidental that 
the most progress was made in terms of institutionalization and in the 
areas where the Union has a strong political mandate and an extensive 
normative framework, such as trade policy and electricity markets. 
By contrast, in domains where member states retain power South East 
European cooperation has proceeded at a slower pace.
Claudia Rose focuses both on theoretical and empirical dimensions of 
the problems and possibilities of regional economic integration between 
the emerging market economies of South East Europe, and makes a clear 
distinction between macro-level trade and micro-level enterprises.
Nada Švob-Đokić addresses cultural collaborations in South East Europe 
in terms of challenging global cultural flows and local identifications in a 
variety of creative programs, projects and schemes. She demonstrates 
through interlinked case studies the importance of networks in the context 
of the rise of social media and computer-mediated communication 
and highlights that the sustainability of cultural communication and 
cooperation in the SEE region has radically influenced the restructuring 
of exiting cultural space. Networking has been tightly intertwined with 
transnational processes and the overall social and economic restructuring 
of the region.
Eric Gordy addresses the clash between soft borders, multiple identities and 
traditional mixing which constitute everyday life in borderlands and the 
hard, exclusivist and ethnicised conceptions and practices of dominant 
political elites through two case studies in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in 
Kosovo.
Francesco Strazzari and Fabrizio Coticchia demonstrate the ways in which 
both organized crime and the fight against it have been crucial in shaping 
the region, particularly in the last ten years in which the externalisation of 
European security concerns had to be confronted with the realities of the 
consolidation of organised criminal groups within mainstream economic 
and political processes in the region.
Giorgio Andrian focuses on a new form of transboundary cooperation 
in South East Europe which is grounded in the eco-regional approach. 
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Dinaric Arc Initiative is a transboundary initiative within that framework. 
Dinaric Arc Initiative created a unique platform of cooperation both in 
terms of inter-institutional architecture that has been developed among 
its members, ranging from small NGOs to large UN agencies, and in terms 
of the territorial dimension of its joint actions, focussed on specific sites of 
common interest. The evolution of trust, over time, between partners on 
the ground, appeared in stark contrast to mandate-driven, bureaucratic 
imperatives of respective head offices. The mix of spontaneity and 
reflexivity, crucial to the habitus of networked cooperation suggested 
that “small n” schemes can achieve real change.
Ana Dević explores the evaluations of the Yugoslav crises of socialism 
and state disintegration and the ensuing nationalist violence and post-
war transitions through the cinema of Yugoslavia and its successor states. 
She shows us the complex relation of film production to hegemonic and 
counter-hegemonic narratives. Her argument traces the practices of 
counter-hegemonic filmmakers in the context of dominant structures of 
funding and political patronage.
This book is a great example of a multidisciplinary approach. Deliberately 
blurring the borders between historical and contemporary analysis, 
between political science, economics and sociology, the authors address 
the meanings, potentials and pitfalls of diverse forms of regional practices 
and discourses and encourage others to build on their work addressing 
the tensions and possibilities in the spaces between global, regional, 
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Democracy Promotion and Conflict-Based 
Reconstruction: The United States and 
Democratic Consolidation in Bosnia, Afghanistan 
and Iraq1 Matthew Alan Hill
The book “Democracy Promotion and Conflict-Based Reconstruction: The 
United States and Democratic Consolidation in Bosnia, Afghanistan and 
Iraq” represents Matthew Alan Hill’s revised doctoral thesis. Matthew Alan 
Hill is currently a postdoctoral research fellow in US politics and history at 
the Institute for the Study of the Americas (School of Advanced Study) at 
the University of London. 
In his first book Hill analyzes a crucial aspect of the US foreign policy 
– democracy promotion. He points out that a mission to promote 
democracy, freedom and peace is strongly imprinted in the American 
political identity and is an important and official part of its foreign policy, 
although the US foreign policy has not been successful in democracy 
promotion due to insufficient support for effective consolidation of liberal 
democracy in post-conflict countries.
In the opening chapter (Chapter Two, following the Introduction) 
the author explains his research framework which is built around three 
contexts. The first context is focused on the so called “American Mission,” 
i.e. the American role in history and in international relations. This role 
stems from the Protestant religious tradition, liberalism and the interaction 
of internationalism and interventionism in foreign policy, which are 
connected to the idealist and realist schools of international relations. 
The second context deals with two theories of democratization – the 
structuralist theory which emphasizes collective actors (social classes) 
and the transition theory which focuses on political elites (recognizing 
the need for democratization of authoritarian regimes). The third context 
introduces the democratic peace theory, which has been put to practice 
by the US President Woodrow Wilson.
1  Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2011. 284 pp, Democratization Studies Series, ISBN 978-0-415-58892-8
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Chapter Three examines the motives for democracy promotion as part of 
the US foreign policy. It analyzes democracy promotion during the Clinton 
and Bush administrations and views them in the context of changes in 
international relations after the end of the Cold War. Hill points out that 
in the last two decades American idealism didn´t have ideological 
counterparts. As a result of that a new US foreign policy has emerged 
and combined security, economic and military interests (realism) with 
democratic and liberal values (idealism). But when put into practice, such 
a combination does not achieve both of its goals (national interests and 
national values) equally successfully. 
In the next chapter, the author reviews US democracy promotion, 
analyzing the activities of the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) in Bosnia and Afghanistan. Hill sees the USAID as the 
main tool for post-conflict peace building. In this chapter he undertakes 
a detailed parallel comparison of the Bosnian and the Afghan case. The 
author provides three basic criteria which must be met by a given USAID 
program in order to determine if it is based on a transition theory. These 
criteria include the willingness of political elites in a country in transition to 
hold free and fair elections, initiation of programs which help establish a 
democratic civil society and the promotion of democracy across diverse 
countries which implies the acceptance of the notion that democracy 
can be developed at any point of time of a state’s development, 
disregarding specific historical conditions. After giving a brief overview of 
the historic development of the USAID, this chapter examines the given 
criteria for Bosnia and Afghanistan. The first (development of democratic 
institutions and holding of free elections) and the second criterion (support 
for development of democratic culture) were clearly met by USAID 
programs in both countries.
In order to examine the adherence to the third criterion, Hill analyzes 
the structural differences seen in the two cases, showing how (despite 
dissimilar levels of modernity and statehood) the USAID made an attempt 
to promote democracy with similar (even identical) tools in both countries. 
That is yet another proof that USAID-supported programs were clearly 
rooted in the transition theory. Similar approaches, with very different 
outcomes, are shown by a parallel analysis of sub-programs of democracy 
promotion in Bosnia (more positive outcomes) and Afghanistan (less 
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positive outcomes). These programs include development of the media, 
elections and electoral administrative development, political pluralism, 
civil society, judiciary and local government. 
The next, fifth, chapter suggests that US democracy promotion does not 
lead to consolidated liberal democracy, but rather to electoral, formal 
democracy. In this chapter Hill examines consolidated democracy in 
Bosnia after the Clinton administration and Afghanistan after the Bush 
administration. The author sees the USAID’s approach, based on the 
transition theory, as too narrow and too focused on formal procedures, 
rather than on substantial development of democratic culture and 
democratic practice within political structures. The failures of consolidation 
of democracy in Bosnia and Afghanistan are measured with three 
indicators (holding of successive elections, unambiguous change of 
executive power, time required for consolidation). None of these indicators 
have been met in the two cases, so it can be said that those two countries 
are far from democratic consolidation (however, Bosnia is much better 
off than Afghanistan) and both experience serious institutional failures. Hill 
concludes his analysis in this chapter by showing how the United States 
have failed to develop a democratic culture in these two countries and 
that they can be viewed as hybrid regimes. 
The idea of formal democracy as an outcome of US democracy 
promotion is developed in the sixth chapter and these poor results in 
democracy promotion are confronted with the objectives and values 
that the American Mission contains (as stipulated in the introduction). 
Hill raises the question whether realist interests and idealist values can 
be reconciled if democracy promotion achieves democratic peace, 
disregarding the fact that full democracy was not achieved and only 
hybrid, foreign-controlled regimes have been established in post-conflict 
areas. Yet, the establishment of inter-state peace did not result in intra-
state peace. Thus the author points out that the United States have 
failed in achieving democratic peace and fulfilling the American Mission 
through programs of democracy promotion. Also, Hill shows that the US 
foreign policy is primarily driven by interests and not by values. Values can 
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In Chapter Seven the author turns to the case of Iraq and tries to use the 
same indicators and criteria (as the ones used in the previous cases of 
Bosnia and Afghanistan) in order to determine whether the Iraqi case was 
also based on the transition theory and whether it achieved democratic 
consolidation. Hill shows similarities between the Iraqi case with those of 
Bosnia and Afghanistan and concludes that the USAID and other related 
organizations have for the greater part used a “one-size-fits-all” model 
which has caused many programs to fail; i.e. democracy promotion 
must be tailored after specific country requirements and circumstances. 
Thus, it also shows how Iraq has experienced institutional failures due to 
inadequate democracy promotion and lack of planning of post-invasion 
actions and methods. 
In the final chapter, Hill examines the present situation of US democracy 
promotion. He points out once again the failures of USAID programs 
based on transition theory, especially in the Afghan case. The author 
shows that the Obama administration has managed to introduce a shift 
in democracy promotion by refocusing from democracy promotion 
towards development. This shows that US foreign policy makers have 
realized that social and economic development is the prerequisite for 
a long-term stable development, growth of democratic institutions and 
of democratic (political) culture. A question remains whether the United 
States has given up on democracy promotion as part of the American 
Mission or is this just a pragmatic, tactical change aimed at achieving 
long-term goals regarding democratization and enabling of peace. 
This book is aimed towards students and scholars of International Relations, 
US Foreign Policy and Democratization Studies primarily, though other 
disciplines, such as Political Theory and Political History might also find 
it of interest. This book is a successful example of blending international 
relations and comparative politics, two sub-disciplines of political science 
which are not often combined. 
Iva Kornfein
